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An open letter from the Shell Foundation 
The business principles of the Shell Group include a commitment to sustainable development – taking 
account of the social, environmental and economic implications of all their activities. But Shell also 
invests in the community – as a way of engaging with the societies in which they operate, and to make 
sure their neighbors share in the benefi ts of their operations. The Shell Foundation is an essential 
element of this – an independent grant-making charity, dedicated to helping people help themselves. 
The Foundation is separated from Shell’s commercial interest. But its ability to make a difference is 
strengthened by its relationship with Shell companies all around the world. 
Beyond its charitable contributions, the Shell Foundation has discovered that investing its capital 
in private enterprise can provide a powerful lever for social and environmental progress, especially 
in our efforts to reduce the impact of fossil fuels, to help poor communities gain access to modern 
energy, and to help them raise their standard of living. Our fl agship programs, such as Energise, 
Embarq, Breathing Space, and Counter Balance, have all worked to stimulate new enterprises that 
help to address fundamental economic and environmental problems.
We believe that investing in small and medium size businesses is a promising avenue to sustainable 
development. Social investments such as these have the potential to produce self-sustaining solutions 
to poverty and environmental degradation. We have found that combining charitable contributions 
and social investments, along with the resources and expertise of the Shell Group itself, has enabled 
the Foundation to achieve greater impact than through foundation grants alone. Yet this complex 
approach is extremely challenging to manage and we have sought to learn from other more experienced 
foundations to guide our progress.
To that end, we retained FSG to investigate how other foundations, corporations and multilateral 
organizations manage their social investments and measure the fi nancial, social, and environmental 
benefi ts that they produce. We are grateful to our many colleagues who contributed to this report, and 
we are pleased to share the results of FSG’s work in the hope that it may assist other foundations and 





Foundation Strategy Group gratefully acknowledges the support of the Shell Foundation in the 
research, writing, and publication of this report. Beyond their financial support, the insights that came 
from their own experiences in proactive social investment, and the guidance that the foundation staff 
provided – especially Kurt Hoffman and Chris West – have all contributed immensely to the creation 
of this report.
We are especially grateful to the three dozen leaders in the field of social investment who took the time 
to participate in our interviews. It is only by listening carefully to their candid insights and thoughtful 
ideas, as well as by reviewing the internal documents they so generously shared with us, that we have 
been able to gain insight into the challenges and opportunities of this field.
research Support
The research and analysis for this report was compiled from interviews and a literature scan conducted 
by Sarah Cooch, Rebecca Graves and Marc Pfitzer of the Foundation Strategy Group.
Disclaimer
All statements and conclusions, unless specifically attributed to another source, are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the interviewees, the Shell Foundation, or  
the Shell Group. 
about foundation Strategy Group
Foundation Strategy Group is a mission-driven social enterprise dedicated to advancing the practice 
of philanthropy, social investment, and corporate responsibility through research and consulting to 
foundations and corporations.
With offices in Boston, San Francisco, Seattle, and Geneva, our international team of full-time 
consultants combine the highest standards of strategy consulting with a deep understanding of 
philanthropy and the nonprofit sector. We invest heavily in research to learn and to develop new 
ideas, and our thinking is regularly featured in such publications as Harvard Business Review, Stanford 
Social Innovation Review, and The Chronicle of Philanthropy.
For more information, please visit foundationstrategy.com.
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 EXEcUTiVE SUmmarY
Social investment defies the absolute separation 
between investments and grants that is deeply 
embedded in the thinking, skills, incentives, 
and organizational structures of philanthropy. 
Nevertheless, a small but rapidly growing num-
ber of foundations, corporations, and multilat-
eral organizations have begun to use investment 
capital as a means of furthering their social and 
environmental missions.
In recent years, the Shell Foundation has joined 
these pioneers by supplementing its grantmak-
ing with investments in business enterprises 
that alleviate poverty or increase access to clean 
energy. Seeking to learn from the field, the Shell 
Foundation retained FSG to explore how other 
organizations manage their social investments 
and measure the financial and social benefits pro-
duced. FSG conducted three dozen interviews 
with representatives from foundations, corpora-
tions, and multi-lateral organizations engaged in 
proactive social investment. Although our survey 
was not comprehensive, we believe that this report 
accurately captures the state of the field today. 
We further hope that our research and analysis will 
contribute to the rapid expansion of social invest-
ment already underway, and to the ever-elusive 
pursuit of measuring social impact.
DEfiNiTioNS
There are many kinds of social investment. We use 
the specific term “proactive social investments” 
(PSIs) to describe debt and equity investments 
in enterprises that deliver social or environmen-
tal benefits that further the investor’s mission. 
This definition excludes both shareholder advocacy 
and passive investment in screened portfolios of 
publicly traded companies – not because they are 
in any way less desirable – but because they require 
an entirely different approach to measuring impact. 
Specifically, PSIs include four types of investment: 
private Equity and Venture capital investments 
in small or early stage for-profit companies that 
generate social or environmental benefits. 
Loans and mezzanine capital provided to non-
profit organizations, privately held for-profit 
companies, or through microfinance loans to 
individuals.
Guarantees that secure debt and increase access 
to capital.
Bonds and Deposits, including community 
development bond offerings and certificates 









1 The field of proactive social investment is still 
nascent. In the United States, PSIs represent less 
than 0.2% of foundation assets, and in Europe, 
despite strong interest, there has been even less 
documented activity. A few organizations have 
been using PSIs for years, but most still view 
their social investments as an early experiment.
2 PSIs include a wide range of investments with 
either market-rate or below-market returns. 
Some are as simple as a low-interest loan to a 
nonprofit organization or a cash deposit in a 
neighborhood CDFI. Other kinds of invest-
ments, such as a biotech start-up or a small 
business loan in a developing country, require 
much more specialized expertise. Among the 
more experienced organizations interviewed, 
we found several examples of PSI portfolios 
that performed at or near risk-adjusted market-
rate returns. 
3 Our respondents gave five primary reasons for 
using PSIs: 
a Using a new set of tools to achieve social 
impact. Social investments can comple-
ment grant dollars to nonprofits or in fields 
where private enterprise is integral to social 
change – such as economic development, 
alternative energy, and health care – PSIs 
can help stimulate business-based solutions 
to social problems.
b accessing funds beyond the normal grant 
budget. Respondents found that their boards 
have been willing to approve an allocation of 
funds for PSIs above the normal 5% payout.
c preserving foundation assets by “recycling” 
funds. Funds paid out as grants are perma-
nently lost to the foundation, while PSIs 
return the capital used, “recycling” the funds.
d asset diversification. Some respondents 
used PSIs to reduce portfolio volatility or 
increase investment returns.
e community recognition and market entry. 
Corporations use social investments to 
enhance their reputation in the communi-
ties in which they operate.  Some companies 
also find that social investment can assist 
them in entering new markets by building 
local partnerships and gaining familiarity 
with the region.
4 The largest foundations interviewed allocated 
only 1% to 3% of their assets for PSIs, although 
some smaller and more entrepreneurial founda-
tions allocated as much as 40% of their assets. 
Foundations with a large percentage of assets 
in PSIs typically considered them part of their 
endowment funds and sought market-rate returns, 
while those with a smaller percentage tended to 
use program funds for low-interest loans.
Proactive social investment can 
help stimulate business-based 
solutions to social problems.
5 Depending on the nature of the investment, PSIs 
can require substantially more staff time, as well 
as a different set of skills, than either grantmak-
ing or conventional investing. However, many 
foundations outsource this work to intermedi-
aries or consultants. Investing in pooled funds 
or CDFI deposits requires minimal incremental 
effort, while intensive staff time may be required 
to invest in early stage enterprises, especially in 
developing countries.
6 Interviewees agreed that measuring both social 
and financial performance is essential in order 
to provide adequate internal reports to their 
governing bodies, improve financial and social 
performance over time, attract funds from 
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other investors, and assist investees in improv-
ing their own performance. Most interviewees 
tracked the financial performance of their 
investment portfolios and of their investees. 
Significantly fewer measured social, or envi-
ronmental impacts, and those that did reported 
that they were still experimenting with ways to 
track these results efficiently.
7 In general, we found five different types of 
performance measurements:
a	 financial performance of the investment. 
Conventional measures of investment 
results such as internal rate of return or 
non-performing debt ratios.
b	 financial performance of the investee. 
Conventional measures of organizational 
finance, such as balance sheets, income 
statements, revenues, gross margin, cash 
flow, and liquidity.
c	 Socio-economic benefits. Monetary benefits 
to target populations, such as increases in 
employment and wages or cost savings.
d	 Social benefits. Improvements in the quality 
of life of the target populations.
e	 Environmental benefits. Environmental 
impacts of the investees’ operations.
8 Social benefits, such as improvements in 
the quality of life, health of beneficiaries, or 
changes in government policy, were best 
tracked through interviews and other data gath-
ered by independent consultants and reported 
qualitatively. Environmental impacts could be 
monetized if there were accepted market values, 
such as the trading price for carbon emissions 
credits. In many cases, however, they could 
only be documented non-monetarily.
coNcLUSioNS
1 Our research disclosed no necessary trade-off 
between financial returns and social impact. 
Investors who sought and obtained market-
rate or near-market-rate returns on their PSI 
portfolios did not do so by accepting lesser 
social benefits. Social investments with high 
financial returns do require more innovation 
and effort. However, it appears that with suf-
ficient determination and creativity, one can 
pursue attractive financial returns and substan-
tial social impact simultaneously.
2 The diversity of social investments available 
mirrors the range of traditional investment 
vehicles, from simple loans to complex finan-
cial transactions. Given the variety of options, 
any foundation could easily add some form of 
social investment to its portfolio.
3 Depending on the nature of the transaction, the 
administrative costs of sourcing, structuring, 
managing, and measuring the impact of PSIs 
can be substantial. In some cases, organizations 
supplemented their investments with almost 
as much additional funding for technical assis-
tance to investees or to cover the cost of col-
lecting financial and social performance data. 
PSIs tend to be much larger than grants, however, 
so the incremental staff time per dollar may not 
be as disproportionate as it is per transaction.
4 Most respondents found that their actual expe-
riences with PSIs were better than initially 
expected. In general, loss rates were lower 
while profitability and program impact were 
higher than anticipated. This may be the result 
of a general tendency to overestimate the risks 
associated with new transactions or to antici-
pate a false trade-off between social benefits 
and economic returns. As a result, none of the 
three dozen organizations interviewed have 
decreased their PSI portfolios, and a major-
ity have increased their allocation of assets to 
PSIs over time.
Social investment defies the 
absolute separation between 
investments and grants that is 
deeply embedded in the thinking, 
skills, incentives and organizational 
structures of philanthropy. 
5 Financial metrics can be compared across 
investments and, everything else being equal, 
the investment with a higher financial return 
will be universally preferred. To a lesser 
degree, socio-economic benefits can also be 
meaningfully compared. Social or environ-
mental outcomes, however, can rarely be com-
pared. One reason for this is the lack of any 
widely accepted standard methodology for 
measuring social and environmental impact. 
A second reason, however, is the inherent 
subjectivity of social goals: different social 
investors may weigh the value of the same 
outcome differently, based on how it aligns 
with their personal or institutional priorities. 
Therefore, even if standardized measures of 
social impact could be developed, the non-
financial benefits of PSIs would not be fungible 
in the way that financial returns are.
6 The case study of REED presented in this 
report captures well all five measures of per-
formance, and it confirms that PSIs can deliver 
socio-economic and environmental benefits 
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that greatly exceed the amount invested while 
still recouping the initial capital and provid-
ing an attractive financial return. REED limits 
its cost/benefit analysis to readily quantifi-
able results that have occurred up to the time 
of the evaluation. Although this understates 
the full impact of their investments, it greatly 
increases the reliability and credibility of the 
results they report.
7 Four clear lessons for measuring performance 
emerged from our research:
a Set clear goals and establish a baseline 
at the outset. It is extremely important to 
have a clear set of both social and financial 
goals at the outset, and to establish baseline 
measures for indicators associated with each 
goal as part of the initial investment process, 
in order to be able to track the changes that 
occur as a result of the investment.
There is clear evidence that 
proactive social investments 
can yield reliable investment 
returns, preserve capital, and 
still provide significant social and 
environmental benefits.
b concentrate on only a few simple perfor-
mance indicators. Given the difficulty of 
collecting data on performance, selecting 
the fewest possible indicators will minimize 
the burden on both the investor and investee. 
A few timely and inexpensive measures are 
better than an elaborate system that may 
never be fully implemented.
c Be prepared to allocate sufficient fund-
ing and staff time to collecting the data. 
Collecting reliable data often requires tech-
nical assistance to investees and in-person 
interviews with many project stakeholders. 
Funders must be realistic about the staff 
costs involved – whether using foundation 
personnel or external consultants – if they 
plan to monitor performance effectively.
d report financial, socio-economic, and 
social/environmental benefits separately. 
Our research suggests that it is preferable to 
use separate methodologies for measuring 
and reporting monetary returns, socio-eco-
nomic benefits, and social/environmental 
outcomes. Social and environmental out-
comes are extremely important but may 
be best presented qualitatively alongside 
the quantifiable financial returns and socio-
economic benefits. Attempts to use a single 
“social return on investment” approach 
tend to increase the cost and complexity 
of reporting and, at the same time, often 
require numerous assumptions that may 
undermine the credibility of the results.
In conclusion, the field of proactive social invest-
ment is still in its earliest stages. Much more 
information needs to be collected about the cur-
rent state of practice to inform and reassure new 
entrants to this field. Yet there is clear evidence 
that proactive social investments can yield reliable 
investment returns, preserve capital, and still pro-
vide significant social and environmental benefits. 
Given the hundreds of billions of dollars in foun-
dation investment portfolios that are not currently 
achieving any direct social impact, PSIs represent 
a vast and powerful new world of opportunity that 
has only begun to be explored.
We are used to thinking of a sharp line that divides 
the for-profit and nonprofit worlds. The former 
pursues financial gain while the latter is concerned 
only with societal progress or environmental pro-
tection. Each views the other’s goals as secondary 
and is indifferent or even antagonistic to the oth-
er’s priorities. The very idea of social investment 
– using profitable investments to achieve social 
objectives – seems deeply disconcerting because 
it contradicts these firmly entrenched attitudes. 
After all, if such an approach were possible, why 
wouldn’t everyone do it?
Perhaps there is an inevitable trade-off between 
economic and social objectives – more social ben-
efit means less profit, and vice-versa. But even the 
limited sample of social investments in this study 
refutes such a simplistic assumption. Although 
there are many opportunities to further social 
objectives by accepting a lower return or greater 
risk, there is clear evidence that one can also 
achieve returns at or near market rates. Admittedly, 
the range of market-rate social investment options 
is far more limited and the transaction costs are 
higher than is the case with ordinary investments. 
This may be partly due, however, to the absence 
of the economies of scale, well-established metrics, 
and vast infrastructure that support global capital 
markets today. 
Why then is social investment such a rarity? 
It appears that social investing is an important 
opportunity that may have largely been missed 
because of self-reinforcing institutional structures. 
Foundations firmly divide their staff between 
program officers focused on social issues and 
investment officers focused on financial returns. 
Businesses separate corporate social responsibil-
ity and community investment from their daily 
value chain of activities. Business schools do not 
teach how to weigh the social and environmental 
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of social work do not teach how to manage prof-
itable enterprises. Social investment may offer a 
tremendous opportunity to increase the impact of 
our philanthropic capital, and yet it forces us to 
make comparisons between social and financial 
benefits that we are unused to making. 
In fact, there is a tremendous imbalance between 
the sophistication and standardization with which 
we can measure financial returns and the tech-
niques available to measure social or environmental 
impacts. Standard benchmarks exist for the finan-
cial performance of investments in every asset class. 
Unfortunately, there are no comparable generally 
accepted metrics for measuring social or environ-
mental impact. Without such measures, it is hard to 
have a sophisticated conversation about choosing 
between social and conventional investments, let 
alone justify any precise asset allocation decisions. 
As a result, social investment has been primarily 
limited to those who, for personal or institutional 
reasons, are willing to experiment with uncon-
ventional investments knowing only that, to some 
degree, they may do some good.
In recent years, a number of people have begun 
to address this problem conceptually, from Jed 
Emerson’s work on blended value1 to David 
Bonbright’s work at Keystone.2 In practice, how-
ever, those who have been doing social investment 
for many years have had to devise pragmatic ways 
of measuring their results in order to manage their 
portfolios and report performance to their gov-
erning bodies.
The Shell Foundation, as a new entrant to social 
investing, retained FSG to survey these more 
experienced investors to learn how they allocate, 
structure, manage, and measure the performance 
of their proactive social investments. This report 
is therefore based on interviews FSG staff con-
ducted with three dozen organizations that engage 
in social investing, including private, community 
and corporate foundations, development agen-
cies, and investment intermediaries. Our sample 
is skewed toward those who work to alleviate 
poverty or provide clean energy because those 
are the primary interests of the Shell Foundation. 
Although our sample is not complete, we have 
interviewed a large proportion of the funders that 
currently engage in proactive social investment in 
these two fields.
Most practitioners have not yet 
solved the problem of measuring 
social benefit. Yet some are more 
advanced than others, and a few 
consistent lessons emerge.
It is immediately apparent that most practitio-
ners have not yet solved the problem of measur-
ing social benefit. Yet some are more advanced 
than others, and a few consistent lessons emerge. 
This report, therefore, presents neither a definitive 
study of social investment nor a comprehensive 
system for measuring impact. It merely reflects the 
state of the field today, offering a few examples and 
lessons that can, we hope, advance the current state 
of knowledge about social investment, encourag-
ing further experimentation and research.
1 See blendedvalue.org.
2 See keystonereporting.org.
The term “social investment” is extremely broad, 
encompassing any investment that brings with it 
the expectation of both a fi nancial return and a 
social or environmental benefi t. Among founda-
tions, endowment funds that are used for social 
investment are often referred to as “mission-
related investments” (MRIs) or “program-related 
investments” (PRIs) – although PRIs have a spe-
cifi c meaning under the US tax code, as discussed 
in the sidebar on page 14	below.
This report focuses on a narrower set of invest-
ments we have termed “Proactive Social 
Investments” (PSIs). PSIs provide direct fi nancing 
to create or expand enterprises that deliver social 
or environmental benefi ts in furtherance of the 
investor’s programmatic goals. In economically 
distressed regions, any enterprise that creates jobs, 
increases income and wealth, or improves the stan-
dard of living can be considered socially benefi cial. 
In mature markets, this category is typically limited 
to new products or services with specifi c social or 
environmental benefi ts, such as workforce devel-
opment or solar energy installations. 






The term “Program Related Investments,” 
or PRIs, is often used to describe any social 
investment, although it has a very specifi c 
meaning in the US Tax Code. 
In the United States, foundations are required 
to spend % of their assets annually, and this 
would penalize social investments that earn low 
rates of return. The IRS has, therefore, made 
an exception for investments that further the 
foundation’s public purpose, designating them 
as PRIs. The test of whether an investment is a 
PRI depends on whether the primary purpose 
was to advance a social objective and not to 
earn income or appreciation. For example, low-
interest loans to nonprofi t organizations would 
clearly qualify because no commercial lender 
would ordinarily offer them.
If an investment qualifi es as a PRI, it is counted 
toward the % payout requirement in the cur-
rent year, and its value is excluded from the 
assets on which future payout is determined.3 
This means that a PRI can earn little or no 
fi nancial return without increasing the burden 
on the balance of the foundation’s assets to 
cover the annual payout requirement.
One consequence of this rule is that a 
foundation could substitute social investments
for annual grants, thereby enabling the 
foundation to retain and grow its assets over 
time, rather than giving away its income every 
year.4 For example, if the foundation earned 
a below-market return of % on its PSIs, its 
assets would grow more rapidly over time than 
through the 2% net annual growth rate from a 
conventional investment return of 7% coupled 
with a % required payout.
It is important to emphasize that whether an 
investment qualifi es as a PRI depends on its 
purpose, not the fi nancial results actually 
earned. Even an equity investment on which 
the foundation ultimately realizes a signifi cant 
profi t or a market-rate return might qualify 
as a PRI. Furthermore, it is the risk-adjusted 
return rather than the absolute return that is 
considered. Foundations might be satisfi ed 
with a return of 1% on social venture capital, 
or the prime interest rate of .7% on small 
enterprise loans, yet these would both be below 
risk-adjusted market rates for their respective 
asset classes.
PRI provisions do not apply to foundations 
outside the US, although there may be other 
governmental restrictions that must be taken 
into account. In several cases, European foun-
dations had to apply for special government 
approvals to invest in PSIs.
3 For example, a foundation with $100 in assets would be required to pay out $5 per year. If the foundation invests $2 in a PRI, it is only required to pay out an 
additional $3 in the current year. In addition, since the PRI is not counted in the foundation’s asset base, the 5% payout for future years will drop to $4.90 based 
on only $98 in assets. If and when the PRI is repaid or sold, the proceeds are added back in to the foundation’s asset base at that time.
4 Most foundations allocate funds for social investment in addition to their normal grant payout. Although it is theoretically possible to substitute social investments 
in place of grantmaking, we are not aware of any foundation that has done so. 
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PSIs therefore exclude the most common type 
of social investment – the use of screened public 
equity and bond portfolios or socially responsible 
mutual funds, whether negatively screened to 
avoid harmful businesses such as tobacco compa-
nies, or positively screened to identify beneficial 
businesses such as alternative energy companies. 
PSIs also exclude shareholder advocacy – equity 
investments in publicly traded companies made 
with the objective of exercising stockholder 
voting rights to influence corporate practices.5 
In excluding these forms of social investment from 
this study, we do not mean to imply that they are 
in any way less desirable. Measuring their social 
impact, however, is an entirely different process 
from measuring the impact of PSIs.
Social investors need not sacrifice 
reasonable financial returns to 
achieve social goals. 
PSIs do include four categories of investment:
private Equity and Venture capital, consisting 
of debt or equity investments in small or early 
stage for-profit companies that generate social 
or environmental benefits. 
Loans and mezzanine capital, consisting of 
loans to nonprofit organizations, loans with or 
without equity participation to privately held 
for-profit companies that provide social or 




Guarantees that secure loans or bond issues and 
lower the cost of or increase access to capital.
Bonds and Deposits, including mortgage-
backed securities, community development 
bond offerings, and certificates of deposit at 
community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs).6
It is important to recognize that each of these 
investments can be approached with the objective 
of obtaining either market-rate or below-market 
risk-adjusted financial returns. The F.B. Heron 
Foundation in New York City, for example, has 24% 
of its endowment in PSIs, and 72% of these funds 
are in market-rate investments. The Foundation 
compares its PSI returns to conventional bench-
marks in each category of investment and rou-
tinely approximates or exceeds the relevant bench-
marks with a similar level of risk and volatility.7 
There are other indications as well that, depending 
on the type of investment vehicle used, social inves-
tors need not sacrifice reasonable financial returns 
•
•
5 For more information on the increasing use of shareholder advocacy by foundations, see CERES (ceres.org); The Foundation Partnership for Corporate Responsibility 
(foundationpartnership.org); Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors & As You Sow Foundation, Unlocking the Power of the Proxy, 2004, available from rockpa.org.
6 CDFIs include community development loan funds, community development banks, community development credit unions, microenterprise lenders, community 
development corporations, and community development venture capital funds, all working to increase the availability of capital, credit, and financial services to 
low-income communities across the US. For more information, see cdfi.org.
7 The foundation compares CDFI deposits to the BanxQuote average of two-year deposits; fixed income investments to Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index; 
private equity to the Venture Economics US Private Equity Performance Index; and PRIs to a benchmark of inflation plus 1%. Ninety percent of the foundation’s 
fixed-income PSIs are investment grade and the portfolio R-squared is 0.84 compared to the benchmark of 1.00. For a complete list of the Heron Foundation’s 
PSIs, see heronfdn.org.
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to achieve social goals. For example, a study by 
McKinsey & Co. and Harvard Business School 
students revealed that, over a ten-year period, a 
portfolio of socially-motivated equity investments 
by “angel investors” generated returns of 8-14%. 
That is lower than the rate typically earned by 
angel investors but comparable to public equity 
market returns.8 Such results are encouraging; 
however, as no comprehensive study of the aver-
age returns per social investment asset class has yet 
been done, social investors have little systematic 
research to substantiate this experience.
Other foundations deliberately choose below-
market investments reasoning that the income 
they sacrifice enables them to accomplish more 
than the returns from a traditional investment 
portfolio coupled with the normal 5% payout in 
grants. The Kalamazoo Community Foundation, 
for example, calculated that it could invest $15 
million in PSIs at a 1.5% annual return and the 
impact on its future grantmaking would be negli-
gible (see sidebar on page 17).
Whether at or below market rate, the diversity of 
social investments made by the three dozen orga-
nizations we interviewed seems to be almost as 
varied as the types of conventional investments 
available. Consider some examples of the PSIs 
we encountered: 
commercial financing or venture capital in 
mature markets
The Rockefeller Foundation’s ProVenEx 
Fund invested in a start-up biotech com-
pany that is developing a microbicide to 
protect against HIV infections. The enter-
prise has since been acquired by a larger 
pharmaceutical company, and the product 
is now in clinical trials. 
•
•
The Canopus Foundation in Germany 
invests in wind farms, earning an 8% annual 
return, secured by long-term government 
contracts to purchase the electricity.
The Abell Foundation invested in a start-
up company that was developing a ‘blocker’ 
for cocaine, on the condition that the com-
pany locate in Baltimore. The company 
has since created 200 local jobs, gone pub-
lic, and the foundation sold its stock for 12 
times its initial investment.
Any foundation or organization 
willing to explore social investment 
opportunities is likely to find 
investments that fit their mission, 
level of expertise, risk profile, and 
financial constraints.
financing for local community development
The Columbus Foundation used $2 million 
to seed an $18 million low-cost housing 
fund to build 1,600 new units of affordable 
housing in the city.
The F. B. Heron Foundation has a balanced 
and diverse portfolio of PSIs that includes 
equities, fixed income, cash deposits and 
venture capital investments. Its holdings 
include:
An eight-year $500,000 loan, at 3% 
interest, to the $20 million Community 
Loan Fund of New Jersey to finance the 
development, construction, and renova-








8 The McKinsey Quarterly, 2004 Number 1.
Mortgage-backed bonds issued by 
Habitat for Humanity International to 
fi nance the construction of affordable 
homes.
A $2 million loan to the Community 
Reinvestment Fund, which is creating a 
secondary market in economic develop-
ment loans by selling them to institu-
tional investors at market-rate returns. 
The Fund’s cumulative loan losses over 
15 years have amounted to 0.19%.
“Blight Bonds” issued by the City of 
Philadelphia to redevelop depressed 
urban areas.
The MacArthur Foundation guaranteed a $15
million fi nancing facility to enable the con-
struction of mixed-income homes to replace 
public housing in a Chicago neighborhood. 
The city had pledged future tax increments 
to fi nance the construction, but without 
the guarantee, funds would not have been 
immediately available.
Start-up or expansion capital for businesses in 
underserved regions and developing countries
In Uganda, the Shell Foundation invested 
$2.5 million, matched by $2.5 million from 
a local bank, to support increased access 
to modern energy services by small enter-
prises in ways that were fi nancially viable. 
The portfolio has been delivering a 20% 
internal rate of return in the local currency.
The Heron Foundation has also invested 
$2.5 million in a limited partnership interest 
in the Yucaipa Corporate Initiatives 
Fund, a $577 million private equity fund 
that invests in businesses that locate in 
underserved communities. The fund has a 
stated goal of earning a 25% internal rate of 









THE BENEfiT of LoWEr rETUrNS
The Kalamazoo Community Foundation 
calculated that dedicating 1% or $1 mil-
lion of their discretionary assets to social 
investment at a 1.% return would enable 
them to put substantially more funds to 
work in their community with only a mod-
est sacrifi ce in appreciation.
They calculated that over a fi ve-year 
period, under a traditional approach, the 
Foundation would make total grants of $27
million and have $11 million remaining in 
its endowment.9 After using $1 million for 
social investments, the foundation would 
still be able to make $2 million in grants 
and have $11 million in remaining assets. 
The $2 million reduction in future assets 
meant that the grant payout in year  was 
$1, lower than under the traditional 
approach, but it enabled the Foundation to 
use $11 million more for immediate com-
munity impact, a trade-off they considered 
highly advantageous.
The key to their analysis is the difference 
between the assumed return on social 
investments and the expected return on 
conventional investments after deducting 
the % payout rate. Kalamazoo assumed a 
7.% return on its overall portfolio, less the 
% payout, for a net growth rate of 2.%. 
Since the social investments were assumed 
to grow at 1.%, the Foundation only 
lost 1% of the appreciation on 1% of its 
portfolio, a reduction of .1% in overall 
annual appreciation.
9 Only private foundations are required to pay out 5% per year. Community foundations are public charities and are therefore exempt from this requirement. 
Most community foundations, however, voluntarily abide by the 5% guideline.
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Low-interest loans to nonprofits 
The Ford Foundation maintains a $200 million 
PRI fund that makes loans to their grantees in 
amounts ranging from $1-3 million, typically 
for ten years at an interest rate of 1%.
acquisition of assets
The Weeden Foundation invested $600,000 
to purchase land in Bolivia that is being 
used as a nature preserve and center for 
conservation research.
The California Health Care Foundation paid 
for the development of software to qualify and 
register MediCal participants online. Owned 
by the Foundation, the software now handles 
one-fourth of all registrations in the state and 
is being licensed to other states through a 
partnership with a major accounting firm.
The reported dollar value of PSIs 
is less than 1/20th of 1% of US 
foundation assets.
The diversity of investments available suggests that 
any foundation or organization willing to explore 
social investment opportunities is likely to find 
investments that fit its mission, level of expertise, 
risk profile, and financial constraints. The easiest 
entry point might be making low-interest loans 
to grantees by relying on standard loan terms and 
the due diligence that is already in place for the 
grant approval. A second level might involve find-
ing CDFIs, microfinance funds, and other social 
investment vehicles managed by experienced third-
parties. Finally, the most innovative and sophis-
ticated social investors can develop the expertise 
to identify and invest in for-profit enterprises that 





An obvious question is how some of these invest-
ments can earn attractive rates of return and yet 
not be served by traditional investors. We believe 
that the answer lies in the difference between mar-
ket failures and market gaps. Philanthropy often 
addresses market failures – where there are no 
financial incentives to meet a need, such as provid-
ing food to the indigent. Social investments can-
not address a complete market failure. There are 
other situations, however, where a viable financial 
model is possible but has not yet been developed. 
Such situations arise for a variety of reasons. 
For example, they may involve small transactions 
that lack any means of aggregation, as was the case 
with microfinance loans before foundations and 
nonprofits created the mechanisms to manage and 
consolidate portfolios, demonstrating that com-
mercially viable rates of return could be earned.
Market gap investments may also require longer-
term investment periods, involve unusual collat-
eral, rely on untested concepts, or simply require 
extra attention in their origination and manage-
ment. New financial instruments are invented all 
the time, but only the few social investors have 
any incentive to invent financial instruments that 
specifically address social problems. Once a viable 
solution is developed, conventional capital markets 
may also begin to participate, greatly expanding 
the pool of capital available. In short, if founda-
tions are willing to take on the risk and complexity 
of pioneering financial solutions to these market 
gaps, they can achieve program objectives while 
still creating investments that earn market-compa-
rable returns.
Despite these compelling reasons for engaging in 
social investment, it remains a rarity. Our research 
suggests that, at present, the majority of founda-
tions that engage in PSIs are in the US, although 
there is substantial and rapidly increasing interest 
among European foundations. The available data 
indicate that 99.3% of all socially invested funds are 
in publicly traded screened portfolios rather than 
in proactive social investments. According to the 
latest data available from the Foundation Center, 
fewer than 1% of US foundations in 2001 reported 
having any PSIs, and the reported dollar value is 
less than 1/20th of 1% of US foundation assets.11 
Of these foundations, the vast majority (85%) are 
private foundations, while corporate foundations, 
community foundations, and operating founda-
tions each make up about 5% of this group.
We found little current data about the magnitude 
of social investment activity by asset class in the 
US and no reliable estimates of social investment 
outside the US. However, Figure 1 above offers a 
sense of the relative magnitude of different types 
of social investment based on the most recent 
available data from 2000 and 2003. It is clear that 
much more timely and reliable collection of data 
about all types of social investments is an essential 
pre-requisite for further development of the field.
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10 An estimated $441 billion of investments are classified as both screened public equity and bonds and “shareholder advocacy,” so when totaling US social investments, 
one must subtract this to avoid double counting. The totals for screened public equity and bonds, shareholder advocacy, community development venture capital, 
and community investments in CDFIs are all 2003 numbers. All others provided are for 2000. Sources: “2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends In 
the United States,” Social Investment Forum Industry Research Program; “The Investor’s Toolkit: Generating Multiple Returns Through a Unified Investment 
Strategy,” Jed Emerson, Timothy Freundlich, and Shari Berenbach, 2004; “Assessing ProVenEx Performance and Identifying Directions for the Future,” Boston 
Consulting Group, August 2002.
11 PRI Financing: Trends and Statistics 2000-2001. 
figure 1 Estimated scale of social investment10
iNVESTmENT TYpE ESTimaTED ScaLE of  
iNVESTmENT (USD millions)
pSis
Community development investments 13,500
Private equity and venture capital 585
Loans to nonprofits 300
other Social investments
Screened public equity and bond funds 2,143,000
Shareholder advocacy 448,000
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raTioNaLE for SociaL iNVESTmENT
Although a few organizations have been solidly 
committed to social investment for many years, 
the majority of our interviewees still view their 
PSIs as experimental. Despite their caution, it is 
worth noting that none of the three dozen orga-
nizations we interviewed had been disappointed 
or had decreased their allocation of funds to PSIs. 
On the contrary, most had increased their allocation 
over time as they gained experience. This suggests 
that whatever the original rationale, the social and 
financial results these investors have encountered 
were better than originally anticipated. 
In our interviews, the specific rationale given for 
deciding to explore PSIs varied, but five reasons, 
in particular, tended to recur:
accessing additional funds outside the 
grantmaking budget
Most foundations are conservative in their annual 
spending, limiting their payout to the required 5% 
minimum in order to preserve their endowments. 
In addition, foundations generally maintain a clear 
separation between the investment of their endow-
ment funds and the allocation of grant dollars to 
program objectives. As a result, at any given time, 
95% of the foundation’s assets are not employed 
in pursuit of its mission. As Luther Ragin of the 
F.B. Heron Foundation describes it, “Most foun-
dations are actually investment companies that 
merely use a portion of their free cash flow for 
social purposes.”
By utilizing endowment assets for social invest-
ing, foundations are able to dedicate more of their 
assets to social objectives and potentially increase 
their impact. In contrast to an increase in the grant 
budget, the cost of a PSI is only the difference in 
rates of return or the level of risk and, therefore, 
the extra allocation will not permanently deplete 
the endowment or set a new standard for annual 
payout. Most foundations start slowly with a one-
time allocation above and beyond the normal grant 
payout in order to gain experience with the level of 
risk and return before committing any substantial 
portion of their assets to PSIs. Even allocating 2% 
of the portfolio to PSIs, however, would increase 
a normal grantmaking budget by 40%.
Even allocating 2% of the endowment 
to PSIs would increase a normal 
grantmaking budget by 40%.
Using a new set of tools to address  
social issues 
Foundations have many ways of achieving social 
impact, such as convening, research, and technical 
assistance. When it comes to using their financial 
resources, however, foundations typically restrict 
themselves to the single mechanism of making 
grants. Many social needs and market failures 
are well served through grants, but they are not 
the only kind of funding needed. Nonprofits may 
need loans to get through a difficult time, to buy 




equipment or acquire a building that can be grad-
ually paid down, or to expand into new services 
that will ultimately produce income. Many of the 
foundations interviewed use PSIs to make loans to 
their own grantees, finding that by pairing loans 
with grants they can help their grantees establish 
credit, encourage more rigorous financial man-
agement systems, and offer greater flexibility in 
helping grantees meet their goals. Some founda-
tions even develop explicit strategies that leverage 
the synergy between grants and investments to 
achieve a larger vision.12
The nonprofit sector, however, is not the only 
way to address social problems. Issues such as 
economic development, poverty alleviation, the 
provision of clean energy, or improved health 
care are inextricably linked with private enterprise. 
Many other social needs, from pharmaceutical 
research to the manufacture of anti-malarial bed 
nets can also be addressed through business-based 
solutions – especially if below-market capital is 
available to subsidize the start-up costs. In recent 
years, a new generation of social entrepreneurs 
has increasingly turned to the tools of business to 
achieve social change.13
This is not to suggest that the role of philanthropy 
could ever be replaced by commerce. All of the 
foundations interviewed believed that PSIs could 
effectively supplement their grants, but none felt 
that investments should replace grants. They merely 
expanded the options for solving a social problem.
Several interviewees found that 
they had obtained better returns 
on their PSIs than on their 
conventional investment portfolios. 
A further advantage may be gained when market-
rate returns can be earned. After all, the global 
pool of investment capital vastly exceeds the 
philanthropic capital available. As a result, when 
a commercially viable approach is discovered 
that addresses social needs, it can grow far more 
rapidly by tapping global capital markets than by 
remaining dependent on philanthropic support. 
12 See Brophy, Paul, John Monahan, Kristin Siglin, and Christa Velasquez, Integrated Philanthropic Investment Strategies for Community and Economic Development: 
A Briefing Paper, 2005.
13 For an excellent description of the social entrepreneurship movement, see David Bornstein, How to Change the World, Oxford University Press, 2005.
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Microfinance, cited above, is the most promi-
nent example of a new approach, pioneered by 
foundations and nonprofits through grants and 
below-market investments, that has proven to be 
a commercially viable enterprise capable of gen-
erating market-rate returns. As a result, the field 
has attracted nearly $9 billion in capital, providing 
assistance to nearly 60 million households.14 
preserving the foundation endowment by 
“recycling” funds
Upon giving a grant, a foundation relinquishes 
any future use of those funds. In contrast, when 
making a PSI – depending on the level of risk – 
a foundation will most likely be able to recoup 
its capital together with a profit upon repayment 
of the loan or upon exit from the equity invest-
ment, enabling the funds to be “recycled” for 
future investments or grants. In the words of one 
interviewee: “We always say that when you make 
a grant you have absolute certainty of 100% loss of 
capital. As socially motivated people, we see PRIs 
as financially efficient grantmaking because the 
capital is preserved.”
Although there has not been any definitive study 
of loss ratios on PSIs – and many of the invest-
ments described in our interviews were too recent 
to predict the final outcomes – a number of the 
organizations we interviewed reported that sig-
nificant losses were rare. Most had begun with 
the expectation of substantial losses, but found 
instead that their loss experience was more 
often in the range of 1% to 3% of the portfolio. 
Those organizations that have deliberately 
sought to minimize losses have been able to do so. 
For example, Triodos, a bank that lends to socially 
responsible projects, reported a loss ratio of 1/10 of 
1% on its loan portfolio over a twenty-year period. 
Other funders may embark on a PSI program 
with a much greater appetite for risk, deliberately 
setting loss targets of 10% to 30%, yet several of 
them reported that their actual loss was substan-
tially below the authorized level. 
In general, most of the interviewees we spoke 
with reported that they were achieving positive 
net returns on their overall PSI portfolio and were 
successful in recycling their philanthropic capital. 
asset diversification 
Although social investments are often thought of 
as sacrificing financial returns, several interview-
ees found that they had obtained better returns on 
their PSIs than on their conventional investment 
portfolios, especially in the weak investment cli-
mate of the past few years. These foundations dis-
covered – sometimes intentionally and sometimes 
unexpectedly – that PSIs offered an opportunity 
to diversify foundation assets beyond traditional 
investment options. In some cases, concession-
ary interest rates on below-market loans ended 
up outperforming declining stock market port-
folios in 2000 through 2002. In other cases, PSIs 
led foundations to invest in venture capital and 
other alternative investments with higher risk 
but greater rewards than the more conservative 
investments in their conventional portfolios. 
 “We always say that when you 
make a grant you have absolute 
certainty of 100% loss of capital. 
As socially motivated people, we 
see PRIs as financially efficient 
grantmaking because the capital  
is preserved.”
The board of the Abell Foundation in Baltimore, 
for example, was comfortable with the higher risk 
profile of venture investing. Their PSI portfolio 
is weighted toward venture capital funds that 
bring new businesses to Baltimore in order to cre-
ate jobs or that fund environmentally beneficial 
ventures that traditional venture capitalists would 
consider insufficiently rewarding. As a result, they 
14 See cgap.org.
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have earned an average 12% return on their PSIs. 
In their words: “One reason we started making 
mission-related venture capital investments was 
our skepticism about the return on more tradi-
tional investments. Our first goal was a desire to 
make money with our available assets.”15
Among the smaller foundations,  
we found much more aggressive 
PSI allocations. 
community recognition and market entry
Corporations, more than foundations, may feel 
the need to demonstrate publicly their commit-
ment and generosity to the communities in which 
they operate. For these companies, social invest-
ments are one way to enhance their reputations, 
especially for banking, insurance, and financial 
service companies that are in the business of lend-
ing or investing capital. None of the corporations 
we interviewed suggested that achieving a busi-
ness benefit was the primary reason they engaged 
in social investments, but one did acknowledge 
that “Social investments enable us to put our best 
face forward in the community. Businesses [that 
engage in social investing] will get credibility 
for sustained commitment and can mention the 
investments in certain settings to aid branding and 
corporate image enhancement.” 
In addition, some corporations use social invest-
ment as a way of entering new markets, especially 
in developing countries, by building local relation-
ships and an understanding of the local market.
capiTaL aLLocaTioN DEciSioNS
Among the organizations studied, there are a 
few long-standing PSI programs at foundations 
such as the Rockefeller Foundation, MetLife, the 
Ford Foundation, and the F.B. Heron Foundation. 
However, many foundations are testing this 
approach with a very small proportion of their 
funds. Some of these foundations do not even 
have any specific budget allocation for social 
investments because so far they have only made 
one or two small experimental investments.
Among those surveyed, debt was much more 
common than equity investments. Loans have a 
pre-set repayment time period and clear rates of 
return and are therefore relatively easy to fore-
cast. Loans are also the only way to ‘invest’ in a 
nonprofit organization, since ownership equity 
does not exist. Equity investments are less predict-
able. The exit strategy is unclear, the time period 
before realizing the investment return is unknown, 
and the return rate – although it may be higher 
– is uncertain. In fact, equity investments in small 
enterprises may not have any realistic exit strategy 
if the proprietor is unwilling to sell or if there is no 
local buyer.
Once a foundation makes a sustained commitment 
to social investing, most set a dollar value or per-
centage of assets as a ceiling for social investments. 
None of our interviewees could articulate a clear 
rationale for why the particular ceiling had been 
chosen beyond a general sense of comfort by the 
board, or an inability to find additional attractive 
social investments. The largest foundations have 
set aside a substantial amount of money, yet it 
remains a very small percentage of their assets – the 
Ford Foundation has a $200 million PRI portfolio 
and the Packard Foundation has a $124 million 
portfolio, but these still represent only 2% of these 
foundations’ total assets. Among the smaller foun-
dations, we found much more aggressive PSI allo-
cations. For example, the Kalamazoo Community 
15 Note that this purpose clearly disqualifies such investments from being treated as PRIs under the US Tax Code.
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Foundation sets a ceiling of 12% of its unrestricted 
assets, while the Heron Foundation has set a tar-
get of moving 30% of its assets into PSIs over the 
next few years, and the Canopus Foundation in 
Germany has 40% of its assets in PSIs. 
Figure 2 on page 27 offers a sampling of the PSI cap-
ital allocations of a wide range of organizations.
The majority of foundations studied chose to use 
program funding to fi nance their PSIs, and they 
gave three reasons for doing so. First, US foun-
dations that treated these investments as PRIs 
counted them toward the current grant payout and 
excluded them from the asset base on which future 
payout would be calculated. Second, this explicitly 
tied PSI activity to grantmaking by putting it under 
the control of program rather than investment 
staff. This ensured that investments would only be 
made when they served program objectives and 
encouraged the combination of loans and grants in 
devising strategies or supporting grantees.
The board’s duty is not only to 
protect and grow the assets of the 
foundation, but to use those assets 
to help achieve its public purpose 
and social mission.
Finally, designating PSIs as program funds 
avoided any potential concern about the board’s 
fi duciary duties, especially with regard to high-
risk or below-market investments. In theory, the 
board’s duty is not only to protect and grow the 
assets of the foundation, but to use those assets to 
help achieve its public purpose and social mission. 
In practice, however, some board members are 
wary of any investments that depart from maximiz-
ing the foundation’s risk-adjusted fi nancial returns. 
For them, the easiest solution is to circumvent 
the issue by accounting for PSIs as program 
expenditures. 
caLVErT SociaL iNVESTmENT fUND
Calvert, a $10 billion asset management fi rm, 
has long been a leader in social investment. 
The diverse array of conventional fi nancial 
products and mutual funds that they offer also 
includes socially responsible investment funds – 
screened portfolios selected on the basis of both 
fi nancial performance and social responsibility.
Calvert also offers proactive social investments 
through several vehicles:
The Calvert Social Investment Fund is an 
$18 million fund that makes loans to more 
than 186 community organizations and 
returned 2.18% in annual interest income. 
The Calvert Special Equities Program 
invests in high-risk companies that provide 
market-based solutions to social, environ-
mental, and health problems. For example, 
one investment is in PowerZyme, a company 
that is developing enzyme-based batteries 
that are more effi cient and less environmen-
tally harmful than lithium ion batteries.
Calvert Community Investment Notes, 
issued by the affi liated nonprofi t Calvert 
Foundation, provide below-market loans to 
community-based nonprofi t organizations. 
The Foundation uses its own assets to sub-
sidize the due diligence and monitoring of 
investments as well as to provide a layer of 
security that protects the Notes from bor-
rower defaults. Proceeds from the Notes 
are invested in 60 different countries and in 
all 50 US states. At present, $75 million in 
Notes are outstanding.
In addition, Calvert will create and manage 
customized portfolios for foundations and other 
large social investors that target specifi c areas 






On the other hand, those foundations that have 
a substantial portion of their assets in PSIs tend 
to treat them as endowment rather than program 
funds and, understandably, a majority of these 
investors seek market-rate returns. These founda-
tions also seem to have a more aggressive entre-
preneurial culture and a higher comfort level with 
alternative investments. 
The corporate foundations we interviewed had 
a third option of using company funds for social 
investments, and under various circumstances 
there appeared to be clear advantages to the use 
of one or the other. For example, some social 
investments in the US – such as those that cre-
ate employment in economically depressed areas 
– carry tax credits that repay through immediate 
tax savings as much as 30% of the funds invested. 
These credits can only be used if the investment 
is made with corporate funds. Conversely, invest-
ments that carry significant risk or very low rates 
of return can be made from the foundation without 
violating the company’s investment parameters or 
lowering its return on equity.
iNVESTmENT STrUcTUrE aND 
maNaGEmENT
Staffing
The management of PSIs involves a unique set of 
challenges for foundations. Typically, foundations 
employ experienced program officers and experi-
enced investment officers, but each has a very dif-
ferent set of skills, and it is rare to find someone who 
has the experience to combine social and financial 
analysis. Foundations also tend to be structured in 
ways that reinforce the separation between invest-
ment and grantmaking, so that it is not always clear 
where in the organization a PSI manager belongs or 
to whom he or she should report. This is reflected 
by the fact that several foundations had sepa-
rate departments for their PSIs or had delegated 
responsibility to outside consultants. Finally, every 
interviewee we spoke to cautioned us about the 
amount of staff time required to source, structure, 
and monitor a PSI portfolio. 
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figure 2 Sample pSi allocations
foUNDaTioN Type of Social  
investment activity




abell foundation Social venture capital Endowment 15%
annie E. casey 
foundation
Community investments in 
CDFIs, loans to nonprofits, 
social venture capital
Endowment 3%
canopus foundation Social venture capital Endowment 40%
Esmee fairbairn 
foundation
Loans to nonprofits Endowment <1%
f.B. Heron 
foundation





ford foundation Loans to grantees Program 2%
Helen Bader 
foundation
Socially targeted loans, 






Socially targeted loans, 





Loans to nonprofits Program 2%
metLife Social 
investment program
Loans to nonprofits, social 
venture capital
Company funds na
David & Lucile 
packard foundation
Loans to nonprofits Program 2%
prudential Social 
investment program
Loans to nonprofits 
(through foundation), 









ments, socially targeted 
loans, social venture 
capital
Program 0.5%
Shell foundation Socially targeted invest-
ments, social venture 
capital
Program na






   * In fact, investors are often contractually limited from directing the intermediary to make specific investments to avoid increasing their exposure to liability. 
figure 3 Direct versus indirect investments
impLicaTioNS DirEcT iNVESTmENTS iNDirEcT iNVESTmENTS
Level of control 
in end-investee 
relationship
High By initiating and managing 
its own investments, a foundation 
can select specific investees, control 
the relationship, and monitor the 
investment as it wishes
Low A foundation typically has 
no direct contact with individual 
investees, nor does it control their 
reporting process.




High A foundation can select 
specific investees and investment 
vehicles that are tailored to its 
mission and program focus areas.
Low A foundation can select 
investment intermediaries  
based on the issue areas  
(e.g., affordable housing) and 
geographies their investment fund 
addresses. However, a foundation 





High Unless it contracts with a 
third party, a foundation must 
have staff resources dedicated to 
sourcing investments, perform-
ing due diligence, as well as 
managing and monitoring all 
investments. Interviewees warn 
that these costs should not be 
underestimated.
Low The investment intermediary 
sources and manages the invest-
ments. The foundation pays the 
intermediary a management fee 
for this service or the intermediary 
may cover its costs through the 
spread between the interest rate 
charged borrowers and the interest 




High A foundation must seek out 
potential deals through networks 
and other sources. This process 
became easier over time for 
foundations as their reputation as 
investors grew.
None The investment intermedi-
ary sources all deals.
reputational risk High If a foundation is forced to 
pressure a borrower to repay a 
delinquent loan or the organiza-
tion in which the foundation has 
an equity stake goes bankrupt 
or is implicated in a crime, the 
foundation might face negative 
publicity.
Low The investment intermediary 




Low Most foundations have too 
few social investments to diversify 
their social investment portfolio.
medium/High By investing in a 
large pool of diverse investments, 
a foundation can diversify its risk.
investing through intermediaries  
or affiliates
Little extra work is required for the foundations 
that choose to invest indirectly by using an outside 
fund as an intermediary, hiring consultants, work-
ing through local nonprofit partners, or limiting 
their social investments to deposits in CDFIs. In the 
words of one foundation: “If you invest in capable 
intermediaries, the work may not be very differ-
ent from what you are doing today with grants.” 
On the other hand, the costs are merely shifted 
to the intermediary, resulting in higher manage-
ment expenses than in conventional investments. 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation, for example, 
invested in a private equity fund that was targeted 
toward investments in Baltimore-based compa-
nies which required an extra 1.5% management 
fee to cover the incremental cost of workforce 
development supports. Other funds, such as the 
Calvert Social Investment Fund or the Acumen 
Fund, report that they rely on grant support in 
addition to management fees to cover the higher 
costs of investing and measuring the social impact 
of their investments. In short, while foundations 
that invest through intermediaries do not directly 
incur added costs, they must be prepared to cover 
the added costs of the intermediary.
There are a number of other benefits and draw-
backs associated with the choice of whether 
or not to invest through an intermediary. 
Direct investments provide investors with more 
control and focus. Indirect investments offer 
more diversification yet may not be as closely 
tied to specific program objectives. For example, 
one may invest in economic development funds 
or alternative energy funds and align the invest-
ments with program areas, but one cannot build 
synergies between grants and investments unless 
one can select specific investees who focus on the 
same issue, geography, and even theory of change 
as the foundation.
Some foundations create an affiliated “fund” housed 
within the organization to manage all of their social 
investments. This fund operates under the umbrella 
of the larger foundation, but is separate from grant-
making or traditional investment activity and has its 
own dedicated staff. For example, the Rockefeller 
Foundation created the Program Venture Experiment 
(ProVenEx), an $18 million fund for social invest-
ments. ProVenEx is funded with program dollars 
and its investments must stay within the foundation’s 
four focus areas, but it is managed by an officer with 
relevant investment expertise.
Other foundations have set up separate organiza-
tions to handle their social investments in order to 
shield the foundation from liability. For example, 
the Kalamazoo Community Foundation uses a 
real estate holding company as an intermediary 
for its PSIs. The Foundation makes a PRI to the 
holding company, which then invests as a limited 
partner in real estate development projects. This 
arrangement twice shields the Foundation from 
liability through its role as a limited partner and 
again through its holding company. 
Indirect investments, whether through affiliates 
or intermediaries, also shield the foundation from 
the less desirable aspects of enforcing liens or 
collecting on defaulted loans. Actions to recover 
funds or collateral carry significant legal expenses, 
but also risk the public relations debacle of a 
wealthy foundation foreclosing on a struggling 
nonprofit or small business. Said one interviewee, 
“There are financial costs, but also public rela-
tions costs, of going after a default whether of a 
for-profit business or a nonprofit organization. 
That’s an issue we are grappling with at the board 
level right now. You need to make a conscious 
decision up front from a financial standpoint and a 
public relations standpoint, and the answer can be 
different for businesses than for nonprofits.”
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Yet another reason for investing through a separate 
organization is to engage other investors. The Helen 
Bader Foundation established a venture capital fund, 
MidCities Investment Management Inc., in concert 
with two venture capital funds, two individual inves-
tors, and a bank. All participate as limited partners 
in the fund and they plan to hire a general partner. 
Since a separate fund was established, outside inves-
tors can participate in its governance and gain a 
sense of ownership for the venture. As a result, the 
foundation may be able to leverage capital at a level 
significantly beyond what it alone could provide. 
With the participation of these investors, the Bader 
Foundation hopes to grow the fund from their initial 
$2 million investment to a total of $30 million.
investing directly
Most of our interviewees took an active hand 
in managing their PSIs, although we found no 
consistency among staffing patterns. Some foun-
dations assign the responsibility to program offi-
cers, while others hire dedicated staff or delegate 
responsibility to the investment department. 
PSIs tend to be far more labor intensive than either 
conventional investments or grants. The Ford 
Foundation, for example, has a staff of 6 people 
to manage its $200 million PRI portfolio, and they 
originate a total of six to eight new transactions a 
year. The same number of program officers at a 
large foundation would typically make 160 grants 
in a year.16 On the other hand, PRIs are often 
much larger than grants. The Packard Foundation 
estimates that their average PRI of $2 million is 
almost ten times the size of their average grant. 
For them, the 2	to 4 FTEs required to handle 10 
new PRIs a year is less than half the staff typically 
required to handle $20 million in grantmaking.
Monitoring investments after they have been 
made is a major factor in causing social invest-
ments to be such a labor-intensive venture. 
One interviewee commented that the ongoing 
management of a PSI took at least three times the 
effort of the initial due diligence. Another esti-
mated that 40% of their staff time is spent on new 
transactions, 40% on managing existing invest-
ments, and 20% on measurement and reporting. 
16 The median number of grants made annually per program officer is 27 according to the Center for Effective Philanthropy operational benchmarking database.
This staffing burden is particularly difficult for 
foundations that strive to minimize administra-
tive expenses. As one respondent said: “We could 
invest four times as much money – the limiting 
factor isn’t the availability of deals but the avail-
ability of staff.”
These incremental costs may well decrease as the 
field develops greater scale and experience, but it is 
a fact of life for foundations that pursue PSIs today. 
Some foundations have compensated for these 
costs in creative ways. The Heron Foundation, for 
example, has invested most of its non-PSI endow-
ment in index funds or enhanced index funds with 
extremely low management fees. As a result, they 
are able to devote the time needed to manage their 
social investments and yet keep the foundation’s 
overall investment costs down to 0.38%.
Taking legal action to recover a 
nonperforming loan risks the 
public relations debacle of a 
wealthy foundation foreclosing on a 
struggling nonprofit.
Despite the required staffing levels, the ‘net cost’ 
of social investment managers may be less than the 
cost of grant managers because the investments 
return income that offset staff costs, while grants 
generate no revenue. Yet none of the respondents 
took into account the income generated when 
describing the staff cost of PSI portfolios.
For those foundations that invest in developing 
countries, the cost of monitoring is even greater, 
and often must be supplemented by techni-
cal assistance to the investee. REED, the case 
study described in Chapter 5, invested a total of 
$1,161,000 in eight small clean-energy companies 
in Africa and Latin America, but spent another 
$400,000 in technical assistance and performance 
monitoring. The Shell Foundation seeded a $5 
million loan fund in Uganda with a $2.5 million 
investment, but supplemented that with a $350,000 
grant to set up the local infrastructure and provide 
related technical assistance. Although these extra 
costs may seem prohibitive relative to the return 
on investment, the foundations explain that pro-
viding technical assistance to improve the skills 
of small business owners in developing countries 
itself advances their missions.
Corporate investors have the additional option 
of leveraging other corporate staff for invest-
ment review and due diligence. For example, 
MetLife has found it beneficial to have an invest-
ment review committee that is broader than just 
the social investment staff. By including these 
employees, they can access investment skills and 
business perspectives and can also recruit these 
committee members to become internal champi-
ons for the program.
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Social investments face skepticism from two 
perspectives: investors often doubt their safety 
and profitability, while donors may question 
their social impact. Even those investors already 
engaged in proactive social investment must 
decide what percent of their overall portfolio 
should be allocated to PSIs, and how to weigh the 
greater financial returns of one investment against 
the greater social impact of another. Each of these 
dilemmas can only be resolved by a deeper and 
more precise understanding of the outcomes that 
different social investments achieve. In short, 
more effective performance measurement is vital 
for the continued growth and success of the social 
investment field.
WHY mEaSUrE pErformaNcE?
The social investors we interviewed provided 
three reasons for measuring the financial and 
social results of their PSIs. 
improving results
Careful measurement of results is essential to 
improving investment performance over time at 
both the investor and investee levels. At the inves-
tor level, it enables managers to test and improve 
their judgment about which deals are most prom-
ising and how best to structure them. It is also 
the basis for determining which investees merit 
follow-on funding and which do not. For example, 
4  mEaSUriNG pErformaNcE
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the Acumen Fund and the Heron Foundation 
periodically rank their portfolio of PSIs based on 
recent performance results in order to decide which 
investees will receive additional funds. 
From the investees’ perspective, performance 
data can help them improve their own operations 
or give foundation staff a basis for recommending 
changes in order to increase either social impact 
or financial returns. Clear and regular reporting 
of results also increases the accountability of the 
investees to their investment managers, and of the 
investment managers to their senior management 
or governing board. 
The financial return on social 
investments can be measured  
just as one would measure the 
return on conventional debt or 
equity investments.
attracting additional funding
Reporting results is essential to encouraging 
additional funding, whether internally through 
increased board allocations or externally through 
the participation of other investors. Whether 
growth in the field comes from the investment 
community, the philanthropic community, or a 
combination of the two, a serious increase in the 
scale of social investment capital will only occur 
if there are solid data about both the financial and 
social results. 
magnifying impact
Large-scale change often depends on the replica-
tion of an idea or on winning changes in govern-
ment policy, and both depend on clear demonstra-
tions of effectiveness. For example, in Ghana the 
United Nations Environment Programme invested 
in an LPG facility to provide cleaner alterna-
tive energy (see the REED case in Chapter 5). 
Their local partner, KITE, documented the results, 
then used evidence of the environmental impact 
to change government policy and evidence of 
the financial performance to stimulate local 
entrepreneurs to create additional LPG facilities. 
Well-documented results, therefore, are one tool 
for achieving social impact. 
WHaT TYpES of pErformaNcE caN 
BE mEaSUrED?
Our research suggests that there are five different 
ways that the performance of PSIs can be measured. 
In describing the results, we distinguish “returns” 
from “benefits” because financial returns do, in 
fact, return to the investor while the social and 
environmental impacts provide benefits to others.
financial return on the investment is the direct 
monetary reward that social investors receive for 
undertaking the risk of investing their capital.
financial performance of the investee includes 
conventional measures of business success such as 
revenues, assets, growth rates, and profitability.
Socio-economic benefits are improvements in 
the economic status of a target population as a 
result of the investee ’s activities arising from the 
investment. At the individual level, these benefits 
include job creation and higher salaries or benefits 
to employees, as well as any cost savings realized 
by customers. At the national or regional level, 
socio-economic benefits include increased gov-
ernment tax revenues, decreased costs in provid-
ing public services, along with increased regional 
investment and economic activity. 
Social benefits are improvements in the well-being 
of a target population as a result of the investee ’s 
activities, such as better health or quality of life.
Environmental benefits are improvements in the 
natural environment resulting from the activities 
of the investee organization, such as cleaner water, 
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reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases, or 
reduced rates of deforestation.
Figure 4 summarizes the extent to which our inter-
viewees attempted to measure each of these five 
metrics. It should be stressed that the chart reflects 
whether any effort at all has been made to measure 
each type of performance. The chart does not reflect 
the level of sophistication or the degree of success 
of the efforts made. In many cases, the attempts are 
still exploratory or incomplete, and the interviewees 
themselves expressed doubts about the adequacy of 
their own current measurements.
It is interesting to note that every one of the orga-
nizations we interviewed monitored the financial 
performance of their investment, 84% monitored 
the financial performance of the investee, 72% 
monitored socio-economic impacts, and 59% mon-
itored social impacts. Only 19% monitored envi-
ronmental impacts, but this was partly due to the 
very limited number of projects we found that had 
specifically targeted environmental outcomes.17
It is also interesting to note that, taken together, 
79% of the development agencies, investment 
funds, corporations, and venture philanthropy 
funds measured all four financial, socio-eco-
nomic, and social metrics, while only 31% of the 
foundations did so. Despite their social mission 
and resources, foundations tend to have a smaller 
proportion of their assets in PSIs and are not 
accountable to outside investors or government 
funders. As a result, foundations appear to have 
less external pressure to measure the social impact 
of their investments.
HoW arE pErformaNcE DaTa 
coLLEcTED?
Financial data were usually collected quarterly 
or, in some cases, monthly. Socio-economic data 
were collected less often – usually at intervals of 
one to three years – while social and environmen-
tal impacts were assessed after three years or lon-
ger. Among the social investors researched, three 
major data collection approaches emerged. 
1 The most common approach is to have investees 
periodically provide data to the investor on pre-
formatted templates. This approach requires 
few resources from investors, other than time 
spent enforcing template submission and con-
tacting investees to fill in incomplete data. 
A benefit of this approach is that the investees 
“own” the data they submit. However, this pro-
cess can become a burden to the investee and 
the data are not externally verified. 
More effective performance 
measurement is vital for the 
continued growth and success of 
the social investment field.
Unfortunately, small enterprises – especially in 
rural regions in developing countries – often 
lack the capacity to keep records or report even 
the most basic financial results on their own. 
If these investees are to report performance 
data accurately, the investor must be prepared 
to cover the costs of helping them build capacity. 
Very few interviewees, therefore, could simply 
rely on a report from the investee to determine 
its financial condition, and where they did so, 
most expressed skepticism about the reliability 
of the data. Said one: “We just have to rely on 
the integrity of the data – we don’t have the 
resources to go out and audit the results.” 
2 The investors that sought dependable financial 
performance indicators sent their own repre-
sentatives into the field to provide technical 
assistance to improve the business’s record-
17 Some investors imposed environmental constraints on investees so that the social benefits would not come at the expense of environmental harms, but these 
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figure 4 Types of performance measured to some extent by social investors studied
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keeping and to collect or certify the data being 
reported. These field representatives visit the 
investee organizations, conduct interviews 
with investee staff and other stakeholders, and 
analyze financial metrics in order to develop 
a more complete picture of performance. 
Field representatives can either be foundation 
staff or local contractors. In the words of one 
investor: “We have found it’s not worth flying 
an international person in to do the evaluation. 
They are too expensive and they don’t have 
the necessary local context. It’s better to hire a 
well-qualified local person.”
Often the field representative can also provide 
technical assistance. Some investors go even 
further and supplement their social invest-
ments with grants to third parties for technical 
assistance and capacity building. Other inves-
tors, such as the Strengthening Grassroots 
Business Initiative at the IFC, use their own 
staff to work directly with investees to help 
them develop internal capabilities. 
3 The third and least common approach is 
to conduct third-party research studies to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of 
the non-financial impacts of the investment 
activities. Although this approach can yield 
detailed results, conducting a comprehensive 
longitudinal assessment of social impact can be 
extremely expensive. Such studies are usually 
done only if grant funds are available to cover 
the cost apart from the investment capital. 
As one intermediary stated: “Since measure-
ment of social impact is resource intensive, we 
can’t afford to cover the costs with what we 
charge for fund management fees. As a result, 
we have to get grants to cover the costs.”
At present, the majority of social investors inter-
viewed rely on time-consuming manual processes 
of entering, formatting, comparing, and reporting 
their PSI performance results. Several organiza-
tions indicated that they are looking for outside 
software solutions to increase the ease of collec-
tion, reduce administrative costs, and help stan-
dardize data among different investors.
Our research focused in more detail on the metrics 
used for each type of performance, as discussed in 
the following sections.
fiNaNciaL mETricS
financial performance of investment
The financial return on social investments can be 
measured just as one would measure the return on 
conventional debt or equity investments. Standard 
financial indicators can be employed, and the 
returns on different investments can be compared 
directly against each other. The majority of PSIs 
we encountered were loans, whether low-interest 
loans to nonprofits, bonds and deposits, or invest-
ments in start-up companies that carried differ-
ent forms of equity participation. Examples of 
the key financial performance indicators utilized 
by the organizations researched in this study are 
listed in Figure 5.
Loans are typically easy to value at their face 
amount, less any allowance for default based on 
signs of trouble at the investee or the historical 
default rate for the portfolio. Investments in pooled 
funds or CDFIs were equally straightforward 
where the fund regularly calculated and reported 
the unit value back to the investors. The returns on 
social investments like these were easily and reli-
ably calculated with little difficulty or expense.
Equity investments that do not trade on the pub-
lic markets, however, were not so easily valued 
and this was especially true for small businesses 
in rural or underserved regions. Some investors 
used the value of the equipment or manufacturing 
facilities acquired as a proxy for the value of their 
investment. Others looked to a range of measures 
used by the venture capital and private equity com-
munity, such as multiples of earnings or revenues, 
recent transactions involving similar companies, 
the price of the last round of equity raised, and a 
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number of other well-accepted valuation method-
ologies. For rapidly growing enterprises in devel-
oped markets these are valid metrics; however, 
these metrics were sometimes used to value small 
businesses in developing regions that do not have 
the same prospects for growth, liquidity, or a sale 
as normal venture capital investments and, in such 
cases, may not be reliable indicators of value.
There appears to be a trade-
off between completeness 
and credibility in reporting 
socio-economic benefits, and 
our interviews suggested that 
credibility is the more  
important consideration.
Not all metrics used to measure the financial return 
on social investments are the same as those used 
for conventional investments. Conventional inves-
tors may look at the opportunity cost of capital 
– the return their investment might have earned 
elsewhere. In contrast, Acumen Fund looks at the 
best charitable alternative. For example, Acumen 
made a $325,000 loan to a company that makes 
insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent the spread 
of malaria in Tanzania. They calculate that the cost 
per person helped by their investment is less than 
$0.01, compared to $0.84 per person for the best 
available charitable option. Such a calculation is, of 
course, extremely difficult and depends on a large 
number of assumptions.18 In reality, it is a measure 
of philanthropic effectiveness, not financial return. 
Such analyses may be helpful, however, in making 
the allocation decision between grants and PSIs 
– if a PSI produces social impact more efficiently, 
it has an advantage over a comparable grant even 
apart from the potential for financial returns.
Another atypical financial metric is the use of 
leverage as an indicator of success. The ability 
to attract capital to a project is important in con-
ventional investments, but only to the extent that 
it increases the profits flowing back to investor. 
In social investments, however, attracting addi-
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
Gross or net IRR on the fund level
Gross IRR on the debt or equity portfolio
Gross IRR on the realizations










Funds dispersed and funds committed Return on assets (ROA)
Capital returned Assets under management
Multiple of capital invested on the portfolio com-
pany level and fund level
Cost of investment compared to best alternative 
option (Acumen)
Paid-in capital and distributed capital ratios on 
the fund level
Pro rata share of net worth of investment  
(equity investment)
figure 5 financial performance of investment – sample indicators
18  Acumen Fund, Metrics Overview, April 2005. How these numbers are calculated is not revealed in the document provided.
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tional capital to a project is itself considered one 
measure of success, just as bringing additional 
grant funding to a nonprofit is considered a form 
of value creation in philanthropy.
financial performance of investee
Strictly speaking, measuring the financial perfor-
mance of the investee ’s organization proves nei-
ther that the investor will receive a good return 
nor that the organization is achieving its social 
or environmental objectives. It is, however, one 
predictor of both financial and social performance. 
A sound business is more likely to repay an invest-
ment and to deliver the social or environmental 
benefits intended. Tracking financial performance 
is also a necessary step in calculating many of the 
socio-economic benefits of an investment, such 
as increases in profits and wages or the expanded 
reach into a target population. These measures 
are also relatively easy to calculate and compare 
according to widely accepted business practices. 
Figure 6 shows a sample of the measures used.
While the metrics are straightforward, as noted ear-
lier, gathering reliable and timely data often proves 
to be a serious problem. Even monitoring the use 
of proceeds can be tricky, as interviewees reported. 
“If you’re not careful, you may think you are suc-
cessful but you’re not really having a good impact. 
For example, you may have good repayment rates 
and you may think your borrowers are doing bet-
ter financially because of your loan, but if you dig 
deeper, you’ll find that they are borrowing from 
another microcredit program to pay back your loan. 
Or you’ll find they used the funds to pay for some-
thing like a funeral or wedding rather than invest in 
some economic activity that will have longer-term 
positive impact for them financially.”
In the case of PSIs in large organizations and more 
developed countries, such as deposits at CDFIs, 
or low-interest loans to established nonprofit 
organizations, the foundations we spoke with had 
confidence in the numbers being reported without 
any external verification. The cost of monitoring 
these investments, therefore, was substantially 
less than the cost of monitoring investments in 
developing countries.
Socio-EcoNomic, SociaL, aND 
ENViroNmENTaL mETricS
Although the promise of social and environmen-
tal benefits is what attracts most people to social 
investments, these dimensions of performance 
figure 6 financial performance of investee’s organization – sample indicators
Revenues (annual and CAGR) Assets (resaleable asset value of the enterprise)
Pre and post money valuation of the  
portfolio company
Number of products/services sold
Gross margin Cash flow analysis
Net profit Liquidity ratios
Financial Rate of Return (FRR) = financial  
benefits to the investee divided by total  
investment costs
Microfinance institution specific indicators
Percent of loans repaid
Repayment rates




Cost of goods sold Cash flow
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are much less frequently or comprehensively 
measured. “In general, financial returns get more 
attention than social/socio-economic returns. 
It’s difficult for people to measure social returns, 
so many people don’t report it. No organization 
is good at this yet.” In fact, all organizations inter-
viewed expressed an interest in better measuring 
and understanding their non-financial results. 
“We haven’t done enough measurement. It’s embry-
onic for us so far… Right now, measurement of 
social impact is based on if we can ‘smell it.’”
One of the reasons social investors are less likely 
to measure non-financial results is the lack of 
a standard measurement approach. Every one 
of the respondents in this study approaches the 
measurement of non-financial benefits differ-
ently. Although many organizations may appear 
to measure the same types of returns, the qual-
ity and comprehensiveness of each measure-
ment approach – even the meaning of the terms 
– vary significantly. As a result, comparisons of 
social, socio-economic, or environmental per-
formance across investments is nearly impossible. 
“In business, we have established generally accepted 
principles of accounting and an international legal 
infrastructure to help manage the reporting of 
financial returns. A comparable standard for social 
impact reporting does not yet exist.”19 
Socio-economic benefits
Many of the benefits of PSIs are monetary or can 
be readily valued at market rates. Social invest-
ments often produce jobs, increase productivity, 
and generate higher wages to employees or profits 
to the owner. The business’s products or services 
may save customers time or money that can also be 
valued. Other economic impacts may be external 
to the business, such as increased taxes paid to the 
National or regional socio-economic returns  – sample indicators
Reduction in cost of national oil imports  
(country level indicator)
Number of jobs created in related industries
Increase in investment in target region Increased profits to other businesses
Reduced costs of environmental protection Taxes paid
figure 7 Socio-economic returns to individuals or investees – sample indicators
Number of jobs created Cost savings to customers (e.g., due to access to 
cheaper fuel/energy)
Savings over conventional sources  
of financing
MFIs only: average loan size (proxy for the 
wealth level of clients to determine if the MFI is 
serving the poorest) Note: this is an outreach mea-
sure, not an impact measure, but it is used as a proxy 
by many microfinance institutions.
Increase in salary/benefits
19 Double Bottom Line Project Report: Assessing Social Impact in Double Bottom Line Ventures.
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government, or increased purchasing from other 
businesses in the region. All these dimensions can 
be quantified in monetary terms.
In the case of below-market loans to nonprofits 
or in affordable housing funds, the savings over 
conventional financing costs and the economic 
benefits to clients served can similarly be tracked. 
Environmental enterprises, too, may create cost 
savings either directly for their clients or for pub-
lic agencies that save energy or incur fewer costs 
to remedy environmental problems.
Figure 7 on page 40 lists some of the measures 
of socio-economic impact we encountered in our 
interviews.
Every one of the respondents 
in this study approached the 
measurement of non-financial 
benefits differently.  As a result, 
comparisons of social, socio-
economic, or environmental 
performance across investments  
is nearly impossible. 
Although valuing socio-economic benefits is not a 
problem, the challenges lie in collecting the data, 
determining the extent to which more attenuated 
or long-term benefits should be included, and 
comparing different kinds of benefits. 
In general, collecting any socio-economic impact 
data beyond the direct increase in income to 
the investees’ employees will require external 
research that must be commissioned and paid 
for apart from the investment. Such research will 
have to confront the question of which effects 
are attributable to the investment and which are 
due to external events, especially when looking 
at regional or national impact. The researchers 
will also need to decide how far out to project 
the impact and how many assumptions should be 
made about future events. For example, if a new 
job is created, should one value the earnings only 
up to the time of the evaluation, or project some 
future discounted value based on an expectation 
that the job will continue for many years? 
The fact that these future benefits are attenuated or 
contingent does not diminish their significance, and 
they would necessarily be included in any attempt 
to catalogue the full impact of a social investment. 
However, the more remote the impact – either in 
time or in the chain of causality – the more assump-
tions must be made to establish its monetary value, 
and therefore the more open to question the final 
calculation will be. In other words, there appears 
to be a trade-off between completeness and cred-
ibility in reporting socio-economic benefits, and 
our interviews suggested that credibility is the 
more important consideration.
This is partly due to the early stage of the social 
investment field and the rudimentary tools cur-
rently available. Most investors lack sophisticated 
enough ways of collecting data and measuring 
impact to make complex calculations reliable at 
this point in time. More important, the limited 
experience that most investors today have with 
social investments means that any calculation is 
likely to be scrutinized with skepticism. A more 
modest impact, based on few assumptions and 
an ironclad methodology, is likely to carry more 
weight than the claim of a larger impact supported 
by complex or unstated assumptions.
Finally, socio-economic benefits cannot always be 
compared directly in the same way that financial 
returns can be. Social investors set out to accom-
plish many different objectives, driven by their 
organizational missions, investment parameters, 
or personal passions, and they are unlikely to con-
sider different kinds of benefits interchangeable. 
For example, two social investors might agree on 
the equivalence of two loans that each pay $10 
in interest, but they might not agree that a $10 
increase in weekly wages to an impoverished fam-
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ily has exactly the same value as the $10 market 
price of a two-ton reduction in carbon emissions.20 
From the investor’s point of view, socio-economic 
benefits are not fungible in the same way that 
monetary returns are.
In recent years, considerable research has gone into 
the idea of developing a “blended value” return 
indicator that would capture the total value created 
by a social investment in a single number. Only two 
of the investors we researched have attempted to do 
this: Roberts Enterprise Development Fund (REDF) 
and Small Enterprise Assistance Funds (SEAF).
“Blending returns is an interesting 
but undeveloped art that is prone 
to ‘black box’ problems.”
REDF’s Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
approach attempts to calculate a blended total return 
for an investment in a socially beneficial enterprise. 
The process is extremely complex21 and, even so, 
the SROI approach only captures financial returns 
and socio-economic benefits – it does not capture 
qualitative social or environmental outcomes. 
SROI was developed to demonstrate that social 
investments can create benefits that exceed their 
cost, and it serves that purpose extremely well. It 
is less useful in comparing different social invest-
ments, however, precisely because it blends finan-
cial returns with social benefits. For example, a 
blended value return of 12% does not distinguish 
between an investment with an 8% financial return 
to the investor and a 4% socio-economic benefit 
to society, versus a 4% return to the investor and 
8% to society, although two social investors would 
likely view these investments quite differently. In 
fact, among our respondents we found a wide 
range of preferences for the balance between 
financial return and social benefit. Some like 
the idea of having a positive social impact, but 
financial return is their highest priority. Said one 
intermediary, “Many of our investors focus only 
on financial returns and aren’t interested in mea-
suring concrete social results – they just assume 
those are there.” 
Other investors expressed the opposite sentiment: 
“We obviously want a decent financial return on 
the investments because getting our funds back 
will provide resources for other projects and will 
also demonstrate that these projects are worth-
while. However, financial return is not our main 
objective and we pay less attention to it than to 
social return.” Said another: “Financial return is 
only 10% of our priority for this fund. The main 
purpose is social.” Obviously, investors with 
these two different sets of priorities may not see 
the same blended value as equivalent.
SEAF has developed a different methodology that 
distinguishes the Financial Rate of Return (FRR) 
to the investor from the Economic Rate of Return 
(ERR) to society. The ERR is calculated by dividing 
the total socio-economic benefits of the investment 
for all stakeholders by total investment costs. In con-
trast to the REED case described in Chapter 5, SEAF 
includes many more attenuated impacts, such as a 
ten-year projection of future benefits, the impact on 
other businesses and competitors in the region, and 
20  Calculated at the prevailing global price of $5/ton for trading carbon credits.
21  At a high level, this approach requires six steps:
1. Calculate the economic enterprise value of the company by conducting a discounted cash flow analysis of the business performance.
2. Calculate the social purpose value of the enterprise by estimating the socio-economic results of the enterprise ’s efforts and calculating a discounted cash flow 
analysis of these results. For this approach, socio-economic results include public cost savings (e.g., decreased welfare expenditures) and increased revenues 
(e.g., increased taxes, increased job income).
3. Calculate the blended value of the economic and social purpose results by adding the economic enterprise value and the social purpose value and subtracting 
any accrued long-term debt.
4. Calculate the enterprise index of return by dividing the enterprise value by the investment amount made to date.
5. Calculate the social purpose index of return by dividing the social purpose value by the investment amount made to date.
6. Calculate the blended index of return by dividing the blended value by the investment amount made to date.
For more information, see Gair, Cynthia, A Report From the Good Ship SROI, redf.org.
even estimated economic values of the social benefits. 
In order to monetize these benefits, SEAF must make 
detailed assumptions that are highly customized to 
each investment and its context, and this limits the 
potential for standardization or comparison with 
other investments.
Most social investors we interviewed did not 
attempt to develop a single comprehensive mea-
sure, viewing the time and effort required as 
prohibitive and expressing concern that the com-
plexity, assumptions, and estimations necessary 
would ultimately reduce investor confidence in 
the results. “Blending returns is an interesting but 
undeveloped art that is prone to ‘black box’ prob-
lems. The assumptions underlying them are criti-
cal and doubt about them can swamp discussions 
of meaning and the impact being achieved – many 
in the field are skeptical about this approach.”
figure 8 Sample quantitative output indicators
Increase in the number of households with access 
to energy (or cleaner energy)
Number of women-owned businesses participat-
ing in a program
Number of bednets sold Reduction in kerosene used
Number of microfinance borrowers Units of affordable housing built
Hectares of forest saved (by not using firewood) 
Sample qualitative outcome indicators
Improved health due to use of cleaner fuels  Reductions in CO2 released




Social and environmental benefits
Unlike socio-economic benefits, social and envi-
ronmental outcomes can rarely be monetized. 
They may include benefits such as improving the 
quality of life, influencing government policy, 
expanding the rights of women, preventing defor-
estation, or preserving biodiversity (see Figure 8). 
Often, it is possible to count the outputs of these 
efforts by measuring the level of activity such as 
the number of lives touched, products distributed, 
or area of habitat protected. Output measures are 
one predictor of impact, and they are easily tracked. 
However, tracking outputs is not the same as mea-
suring outcomes – one may, for example, obtain a 
microfinance loan without necessarily increasing 
household income. Nor are outcomes the same as 
impacts, which require evidence that the outcomes 
would not have been achieved but for the inter-
vention of the funder or investor (see Figure 9).
Most of the investors we interviewed, therefore, 
track outputs as a proxy for quantitative measures 
of social or environmental impacts and do not 
attempt to track outcomes or impacts. In addi-
tion, they usually supplement these statistics with 
a narrative description to give some sense of the 
program’s less tangible outcomes.
If multiple investments are made with the same 
goal, such as different vehicles for financing 
affordable housing, there may be an opportunity 
to compare relative performance on an identical 
set of indicators. Even then, however, one must 
be sensitive to contextual differences that may 
affect the outcomes due to external circumstance 
beyond the investee ’s control, such as differ-
ences in the regional economy or housing supply. 
As one investor reported: “There is a constant 
struggle to present information in a comparable 
format across all projects while still keeping the 
appropriate level of context for each.”
The fact that social investors have such varied 
social goals has implications for investees as well. 
Assuming a social investor is the only funder of a 
project, he or she can designate which performance 
indicators should be used. If multiple social inves-
tors with differing goals are engaged, however, the 
investee may not only be required to report on 
multiple sets of performance indicators, but might 
also feel pressure to pursue conflicting objectives, 
undermining his or her success. One must be espe-
cially sensitive to this issue when attempting to 
leverage funds by bringing in other investors.
Although social and environmental impacts can 
often only be described qualitatively, several of 
our interviewees stressed that this does not lessen 
their importance and recommended allocating 
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22 At the time of the study, after roughly three years of investing, only 5 out of 30 loans had defaulted.
Background
In 2000, the United Nations Environment 
Programme, in partnership with the United 
Nations Foundation and E+Co, developed an 
initiative called Renewable Energy Enterprise 
Development (REED) which provides financing 
and business development support to small and 
medium-sized clean energy enterprises in Africa, 
Brazil, and China. E+Co manages the program 
in each country and provides business develop-
ment support and seed capital to the investees. 
After thorough research and development, REED 
built a performance evaluation approach that 
carefully considers the full range of investment 
impacts from both quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives. REED’s measurement approach 
is one of the most thoughtful examples we have 
uncovered in our research.
The program makes two- to five-year loans rang-
ing from $30,000 to $250,000 with interest rates 
ranging from 7% to 12%.22 Beyond the financial 
return on capital, REED has explicit environmen-
tal, social, and socio-economic goals.
Environmental goals. Increase access to clean 
energy, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, pre-
vent or reverse deforestation.
Socio-economic. Contribute to economic de-
velopment through the growth of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, increase employ-
ment and income, reduce the cost of energy 
to customers.
Social goals. Improve quality of life through 
better working conditions, increased training, 
better health from the use of less harmful fuels, 
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pErformaNcE TYpE pErformaNcE iNDicaTorS
financial  • Return on investment 
 •  Financial performance of the investee enterprise (e.g., sales, gross 
margin, net profits, increase in assets)
Social  • Improved health of consumers from use of cleaner energy
 •  Enhanced quality of life for consumers from spending less time 
obtaining other sources of fuel
Socio-economic  • Additional jobs created by the enterprise 
 • Increased income of enterprise employees
 • Customer cost savings from access to cheaper energy sources
 • Increased income for related industries
 •  Additional financing raised by enterprise as result of REED/
E+Co’s investment
Environmental  •  Greenhouse gas offsets (tons CO2 equivalent), valued at the price 
of carbon credits traded on the global market
 • Deforestation avoided or forest reclaimed (hectares)
indicators
For each of these goals, REED establishes a small 
number of performance indicators that relate 
directly to the goal. They then measure the base-
line level of each indicator during the due diligence 
process before the investment is made. Figure 10 
lists the indicators that REED uses, although not 
all indicators are relevant to every project.
All of the financial and socio-economic indicators 
can be quantified in monetary terms. However, 
REED does not attempt to monetize the social and 
other environmental impacts. Instead, these ben-
efits are assessed and reported qualitatively and, in 
its report, REED places equal importance on both 
quantitative and qualitative measures. 
REED’s local program officers collect the finan-
cial and operational data from investees and enter 
it into a standard format as part of their regularly 
scheduled visits. REED has found that these pro-
gram officers are sometimes called upon to provide 
capacity building for the enterprises so that they 
are able to record and report financial data properly. 
REED works closely with its investee enterprises 
to ensure that its measurement demands are not a 
burden and its capacity building assistance helps to 
ensure easier measurement in the future.
REED staff and consultants also interview a wide 
range of stakeholders:
At the enterprise, they interview the entrepre-
neur and enterprise employees.
In the external community, they interview cus-
tomers, local community residents, suppliers, 
distributors, competitors, governmental agen-
cies, and national utilities.
Within REED, they interview the local pro-
gram officers.
This wide range of perspectives enables REED to 
take a broad view of impacts, looking beyond the 





figure 10 performace indicators
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During the interviews, REED’s interviewers ask 
about the most important social or non-finan-
cial benefits that resulted from the investment. 
The responses are categorized, and REED reports 
the five most often cited qualitative impacts as part 
of its summary, along with a one-page narrative 
about the enterprise and the results of the invest-
ment. Although such an interview process can be 
time-consuming and costly, REED has found that 
the wide range of interviews provides a valuable 
holistic sense of the performance of the enterprise. 
performance measured
For each variable, REED measures only the 
increase over the baseline during the period from 
the time of investment to the time of the evalu-
ation. On the basis of these calculations, REED 
is able to determine a cost-benefit ratio for each 
investment. Among the eight investments mea-
sured, the ratio of benefits to costs ranges from 1:1 
to 70:1, averaging 9:1 for the selected investments 
overall.23 These benefits are separate from and in 
addition to the financial return to the investor of 
the 7-12% interest earned on the loan.
REED acknowledges that there are many other 
environmental and social impacts that cannot be 
reliably monetized. Their goal is to calculate the 
minimum demonstrable benefit from each invest-
ment rather than to quantify the full range of 
benefits that may result. For example, they do not 
count the increase in employment after the term of 
the loan, even though this increase is likely to be 
continued for many years. Nor do they attempt to 
capture more hypothetical or attenuated benefits, 
such as savings in future health care costs due to 
improved health among consumers who switch to 
less noxious fuels. As a result, the REED analysis 
almost certainly understates the true social impact 
achieved by the program.
REED appears to have accepted the inevitable 
trade-off between completeness and credibility. 
Being able to demonstrate a minimum of $14 mil-
lion in socio-economic and environmental ben-
efits from a $1.6 million investment is sufficiently 
compelling that they have chosen an irrefutable 
methodology for a narrow definition of impacts, 
rather than aiming for higher returns by falling 
back on more speculative calculations.24
23 The costs include not only the capital invested, but $50,000 per investee in technical assistance provided by E+Co.
24 Note that the REED report is only a preliminary analysis of 8 successful projects out of a total portfolio of 30 investments. We do not know, therefore, 
whether the 9:1 return earned on these projects is representative of the portfolio overall.
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† Offset GHG emissions are calculated using Government of Ghana data on household fuel consumption in Accra, customer survey data on previous fuel use of 
project clients, specific emissions data for substituted fuels collated in Kolominskas (2003) and assuming all new sales at the enterprise represent additional LPG 
consumption in Ghana, rather than customers switching from other gas providers. For valuation of the emissions, a CER price of $5/tCO2e is assumed and 
transaction costs taken directly from a CDM analysis of this enterprise in Medina-Gomez (2003). Avoided deforestation is calculated assuming that the forest used 
to provide urban woodfuel in Ghana has a density of 83 tons/hectare (FAO, 2004).
management & Employees
Average salary for additional staff, net 
of tangible benefits (USD/year)
360 # additional permanent staff directly 
employed by enterprise
2
Total value of additional wages and 
benefits to existing staff (USD/year)
760 # baseline staff at enterprise, benefiting 
from such increased wages and benefits
10
provision of Service to customers & community
Additional customer cost savings 
(USD)
98,500 Income creation for related industries 
(USD)
na
The enterprise staff provide training to customers in the safe use of gas cylinders. This knowledge 
transfer has raised awareness on safety issues among customers, although many of those interviewed 
could not recall the specific details.
Environmental Effects of operations†
Additional Greenhouse Gas offsets 
(tons CO2 equivalent)
17,700 Value of additional Carbon Credits if 
sold, after transaction costs (USD)
71,000
Projected additional Greenhouse 
Gas offsets over loan term (tons CO2 
equivalent)
41,700 Projected value of Carbon Credits over 
loan term if sold, after transaction costs 
(USD)
164,800
Additional reforestation & avoided 
deforestation (hectares)
236 Projected total additional forest preser-
vation over loan term (hectares)
560
financials and operations
Annual sales (USD/year) 890,000 Annual sales (tons LPG/year) 2,050
Sales baseline (USD/year) 589,400 Sales baseline (tons LPG/year) 1,365
Gross Margin (%) 14.9 Net Margin, after tax (%) 9.7
Additional profits, after tax (USD) 116,300 Additional remuneration to entrepre-
neur (USD)
9,700
Profits reinvested for expansion 
(USD)
38,000 Increase in assets (resale value, USD) 28,000
Tabular summary of project impacts
Sample rEED report
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1 more experienced and capable enterprise workforce, with transferable skills
2 Lifestyle benefi ts of improved energy supply – quality and time available for leisure
3 creation of permanent jobs and improved working conditions for 
enterprise employees
4 improved health conditions – through improved air quality, higher-quality water 
supply and extended community medical services
5 customer cost savings leading to higher disposable household income
































COST / BENEFIT TYPE
Quantitaive cost-benefi t analysis
B/c ratio = 4.5
Benefi ts
costs
The project’s commercial success is both impres-
sive and key to the enterprise ’s most signifi cant 
non-fi nancial impacts. By focusing on a reputa-
tion for reliability, pushing to expand sales vol-
ume, and offering innovative new services like the 
auto-dispenser, the project is providing a boost to 
the LPG industry as a whole, which benefi ts from 
a reputation for profi tability with investors. The 
improved investment climate is encouraging the 
growth of LPG supply networks. As improved 
accessibility of LPG increases household use in 
Ghana, displacing traditional fuels even outside 




Four lessons for successfully measuring the perfor-
mance of PSIs have emerged from our research. 
Lesson 1 
Establish clear performance targets  
and a baseline
Those investors who measure social, socio-eco-
nomic, and environmental returns stress the impor-
tance of developing a “baseline” against which to 
measure net impact at the end of the investment 
period. The baseline is simply an assessment of 
the relevant performance indicators before the 
investment is made. As one interviewee stated: 
“If you don’t have a baseline, you can’t measure 
what you changed.”
Ideally, the baseline will be established as part of 
the due diligence or business planning process at 
the outset of the investment. A number of organi-
zations we interviewed had skipped this step and 
regretted it later when they realized that they were 
no longer able to assess fully the changes that were 
brought about by their investment. 
In addition to the baseline, the most effective social 
investors we encountered had a clear understand-
ing of their goals. By setting concrete targets for 
each dimension of performance – financial, social, 
socio-economic and environmental – these inves-
tors were able to identify the most relevant indica-
tors to measure their progress. As one person said: 
“You need to decide up front what you want to 
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accomplish when you’re selecting areas for invest-
ment, and then decide what to measure as outputs 
and outcomes.”
Finally, clarity of goals at the outset makes it more 
likely that, in the well-meant effort to bring more 
money to a transaction, all investors in a proj-
ect have the same definitions of success and will 
encourage the investee to act consistently. 
Lesson 2 
concentrate on only a few simple 
performance indicators 
Many of the investors we interviewed described 
a tension between wanting as much data as pos-
sible and the problem of overloading both their 
investees and their own staff with extensive mea-
surement tasks. As the performance measurement 
process becomes more burdensome, it inevitably 
becomes more costly, less timely, and more likely 
to fail altogether. In general, data that are easily 
collected and readily available are preferable, even 
if the indicators are imperfect. 
Data that is easily collected and 
readily available are preferable, 
even if the indicators are imperfect. 
If investees are forced to spend inordinate amounts 
of time collecting data or measuring performance, 
they will have less time to spend on executing and 
enhancing their operations. Said one interviewee: 
“We were too aggressive the first time we tried to 
measure social impact. We tried to measure far 
too many things and it didn’t work. We have had 
to redesign our system and now we focus on just 3 
to 4 indicators per business.”
Several investors cautioned us that even when 
selecting only a few indicators, it is important not 
just to focus on quantitative results, but also to 
include qualitative measures. Finally, when identi-
fying performance indicators, the investor should 
discuss with the investee how the data will be col-
lected to ensure that both parties are comfortable 
with the process required.
Lesson 3 
allocate sufficient funding and staff time 
to assist in collecting the data
Respondents frequently cautioned us about the 
time and effort involved in implementing perfor-
mance measurement systems, especially for non-
financial benefits and for newer social investors 
who often begin by testing multiple measurement 
approaches simultaneously. Social investors who 
are serious about performance measurement must 
be prepared to invest the necessary time and fund-
ing for ongoing management. In some cases this 
resulted in below market-rate investment returns. 
In other cases, the investment was coupled with a 
grant to cover the cost of technical assistance or 
external performance measurement, and the grant 
was often equivalent to all or a substantial percent-
age of the investment. 
Lesson 4 
report financial, socio-economic, and 
social/environmental benefits separately
In theory, comparing different investments on the 
basis of a single blended return would be ideal, but 
in practice it is extremely difficult. Some believe 
that such an analysis would be possible if only we 
had better measurement techniques, and there is 
indeed a great need for more standard approaches 
to performance measurement.
Our research suggests that there is an unavoid-
able subjectivity in the value accorded to social 
and environmental impacts. The degree to which 
people care about specific issues is what motivates 
them to engage in philanthropy or social invest-
ing and, as noted earlier, different social investors 
weight various social and financial benefits differ-
ently. Some put great emphasis on the financial 
return, others on one or another aspect of social 
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or environmental impact. Therefore, even if every 
aspect of social impact could be quantified, each 
component would have to be weighted differently 
for different investors.
It is also extremely difficult to quantify or monetize 
many social and environmental impacts; and even 
if a formula for valuing these impacts is developed, 
the methodology is likely to be complex, tied to 
subjective assumptions, and therefore open to 
question. Financial and socio-economic benefits 
are not interchangeable, even though both can be 
monetized. Our research suggests that it is prefer-
able to value each type of benefit separately, using 
conventional quantitative measures for financial 
and socio-economic benefits, and using qualita-
tive measures for social or environmental benefits 
– even at the risk of understating the overall impact 
of the investment – so that the final report is objec-
tive, readily understandable, and credible. 
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Proactive social investment is an activity that 
holds immense promise for foundations and other 
organizations dedicated to social progress, yet the 
field remains largely undeveloped. Most of the 
very limited funds in PSIs are simple low-interest 
loans to nonprofits which, while valuable, do not 
begin to exploit the potential for achieving pro-
gram goals through investment activities. If the 
limited philanthropic resources of the world are 
to make any material difference in solving the vast 
social problems of poverty, disease, and environ-
mental destruction, we will have to find ways to 
use every resource at our disposal. The hundreds 
of billions of dollars in foundation assets currently 
held in conventional investments are certainly one 
resource that must be tapped. 
If social investment is to become widespread, 
several barriers must be overcome. 
1 Better information must be collected about the 
financial performance of PSIs so that potential 
investors can accurately assess the risks and 
returns.
2 The confusing array of social investment 
options must be catalogued so that investors 
can easily understand the choices they face.
3 The constraints of fiduciary duty must be clari-
fied as they apply to higher risk or lower return 
investments that serve the organization’s pro-
gram goals.
4 More intermediaries, pooled funds, or “pre-
packaged” options must be developed to reduce 
the staff time and transaction costs required for 
investors to participate in PSIs.
5 A standardized approach must be developed 
for measuring and comparing returns on social 
investments, including:
a Financial return and socio-economic 
benchmarks by asset class.
b Qualitative guides for social and environ-
mental performance indicators.
c Technology that streamlines and automates 
the collection, aggregation, and reporting 
processes.
6 Better communication among those who are 
active social investors through the establish-
ment of a forum for information sharing.
In conclusion, the field of proactive social invest-
ment is still in its earliest stages. Much more 
information needs to be collected about the cur-
rent state of practice to inform and reassure new 
entrants to this field. Yet there is clear evidence 
that proactive social investments can yield reliable 
investment returns, preserve capital, and still pro-
vide significant social and environmental benefits. 
In short, social investments represent a new world 
of opportunity that has only begun to be discov-
ered. It is our hope that this report will serve to 
stimulate further research and exploration.




Acumen Fund. “Metrics Overview.” Acumen 
Fund, April 2005. 
African Development Foundation. “Innovative 
Investments in Africa’s Future,” 2002 – 2003. 
Berenbach, Shari and Jacqueline Khor. “Private 
Investment for Social Goals and the 
Blended Value Capital Market;” Boorstin, 
Louis C. “Delivering Social Value via the 
Private Sector: A Framework For Market-
Based Interventions.” Workshop on Private 
Investment for Social Goals, World Economic 
Forum, September 21-22, 2004. 
The Boston Consulting Group. “Assessing 
ProVenEx Performance and Identifying 
Directions for the Future.” The Rockefeller 
Foundation, August 8, 2002. 
Brody, Francie, Kevin McQueen, Christa 
Velasquez, and John Weiser. “Current 
Practices in Program-Related Investing.” 
Brody Weiser Burns Social Investing Series, 
2002.
Brody, Frances, John Weiser, and Scott Miller. 
“Matching Program Strategy and PRICost. 
Brody Weiser Burns Social Investing Series. 
Phyllis Joffe, ed. 2003.
Brophy, Paul C., John Monahan, Kristin 
Siglin, and Christa Velasquez, “Integrated 
Philanthropic Investment Strategies for 
Community and Economic Development: A 
Briefing Paper,” January 2005.
Community Development Carbon Fund. 
“Annual Report 2002.” The World Bank, 2002.
Community Development Carbon Fund. 
“Annual Report 2004.” The World Bank, 2004.
Community Development Venture Capital 
Alliance, Social Return Toolkit, 2005. 
cdvca.org.
Carbon Trust. “Annual Report 2003/04: Reduce 
Carbon Emissions Now; Develop Low 
Carbon Technologies; Understand the Impact 
of Climate Change.” Carbon Trust, August 
2004.
Carden, Steven D. and Olive Darragh. “A Halo 
for Angel Investors.” The McKinsey Quarterly, 
2004 Number 1. mckinseyquarterly.com.
Clark, Catherine and Josie Taylor Gaillard. 
“RISE Capital Market Report: The Double 
Bottom Line Private Equity Landscape in 
2002-2003.” Research Initiative on Social 
Entrepreneurship, August 2003. 
Clark, Catherine, William Rosenzweig, David 
Long, and Sara Olsen. “Double Bottom Line 
Project Report: Assessing Social Impact 
in Double Bottom Line Ventures.” The 
Rockefeller Foundation. 2004.
The Community Development Venture Capital 
Alliance. “Measuring Impacts Toolkit.” 
CDVC, March 2005.
Emerson, Jed. “The Blended Value Map: 
Tracking the Intersects and Opportunities of 
Economic, Social and Environmental Value 
Creation.” The Shell Foundation, October 2003.
  BiBLioGrapHY
©	2006	foundation	strategy	group	 investing	for	impact	 59
Emerson, Jed, Timothy Freundlich, and 
Shari Berenbach. “The Investor’s Toolkit:  
Generating Multiple Returns Through a 
Unified Investment Strategy.” Summer 2004.
Emerson, Jed. “Where Money Meets Mission: 
Breaking Down the Firewall Between 
Foundation Investments and Programming.” 
Stanford Social Innovation Review, Summer 
2003.
Enterprise Development Impact Assessment 
Information Service (EDIAIS). “Project 
Overview Document.” Enterprise 
Development, June 2001.
The Enterprise Foundation. “Focus: Achieving 
Size, Scale, Impact, and Sustainability for 
America’s Communities.” The Enterprise 
Foundation Annual Report, 2003.
European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. “EVCA Guidelines.” March 2001. 
The F. B. Heron Foundation Annual Report. 
“Five Wealth Creation Strategies.” The F. B. 
Heron Foundation, 2003.
The F. B. Heron Foundation. “New Frontiers in 
Mission-Related Investing.” 2004.
The Foundation Center. “PRI Financing: Trends 
and Statistics 2000-2001.” The Foundation 
Center, 2003.
Fries, Peter. “Open for Business: Entrepreneurs, 
Clean Energy and Sustainable Development.” 
United Nations Environment Programme and 
The United Nations Foundation, 2003.
George, Clive and Colin Kirkpatrick. “A 
Practical Guide to Strategic Impact 
Assessment for Enterprise Development 
(1).” Institute for Development Policy and 
Management, University of Manchester, 
October 2003. 
Goldman, Aron P. “From Creative Chaos to 
Convergence: Social Investing Today, and the 
Way Forward.” Policy Development: Social 
Investing Research Initiative, November 2004. 
The International Finance Corporation. “2004 
Sustainability Report.” World Bank Group, 
2004.
The International Finance Corporation. 
“Procedure for Environmental and Social 
Review of Projects. The International Finance 
Corporation, December 1998.
Kirkpatrick, Colin and David Hulme. “Basic 
Impact Assessment at Project Level.” 
Enterprise Development. 2001.
Lee, Norman. “Strategic Impact Assessment 
and Enterprise Development.” Institute 
for Development Policy and Management, 
University of Manchester, July 2002.
L.E.K. Consulting. “Investor Perspectives on 
Renewable Power in the UK.” Carbon Trust, 
December 2003. 
Makinson, Sandra. “Social Investment in Europe: 
a Review of the Actors, the Issues and 
Privately-sourced Investment Vehicles.” The 
Canopus Foundation, June 8, 2004.
60	 investing	for	impact	 ©	2006	foundation	strategy	group
Napier-Moore, Philip. “REED: Social and 
Environmental Impacts of ‘Clean Energy’ 
Enterprise Development.” November 2004. 
“Oikocredit Financial Statements 2004.” 
Oikocredit.
Olsen, Sara and Jeremy Nicholls. “A Framework 
for Approaches to SROI.” Haas Social Metrics 
Conference, March 2005. 
ResponsAbility. “ResponsAbility Global 
Microfinance Fund.” ResponsAbility Social 
Investment Services, April 2005. 
Russell, Philip. “Impact Evaluation for the 
AREED Programme in Ghana.” University of 
Oxford, January 2004.
Shell Foundation. “Enterprise Solutions to 
Poverty: Opportunities and Challenges for 
the International Development Community 
and Big Business.” March 2005.
Shell Foundation. “Sustainable Investment in 
Africa: Pipedream or Possibility?” 2004.
SIF Industry Research Program. “2003 Report 
on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in 
the United States.” Social Investment Forum, 
December 2003. 
Small Enterprise Assistance Funds. “The 
Development Impact of Small and Medium 
Enterprises: Lessons Learned from SEAF 
Investments.” 2004.
Tanzania Gatsby Trusts. “Building from the Base: 
The Work of the African Gatsby Trusts.” The 
Gatsby Charitable Foundation, April 2000. 
Tanzania Gatsby Trusts. “Performance 
Measurement.” Gatsby Inter Trust Newsletter. 
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2004.
Thake, Stephen. “Primed for Growth: Adventure 
Capital Fund Baseline Report.” New 
Economics Foundation, July 2003. 
Thake, Stephen. “Sustainable Futures: Investing 
in Community-Based Organizations.” New 
Economics Foundation, October 25, 2004. 
Triodos Bank. “Annual Review 2004.” Triodos 
Bank, 2004.
Velasquez, Christa and Francie Brody. “Should 
We Consider a PRI? Basic Program-Related 
Investment Criteria for Foundations and 
Nonprofit Organizations.” Brody Weiser Burns 
Social Investing Series, 2002.
	 design:	Thinkside, thinkside.net
foundation Strategy Group
20 Park Plaza, Suite 320  
Boston, MA 02116 
United States of America







T +44 (0) 207 934 2727 
f +44 (0) 207 934 7348
shellfoundation.org
